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1 Introduction
Female genital cutting (FGC) is a traditional practice that involves partial or total removal of external female genitalia
or other injury to female genital organs for cultural or other non-medical reasons. With more than three million
infants and children being exposed to FGC every year, currently, more than 200 million women are believed to have
undergone this procedure in 30 countries across Africa, the Middle East, and Asia (WHO, 2016). This practice is seen
as a fundamental violation of human rights, subjecting girls to both immediate (e.g., pain, hemorrhage, and urinary
tract infections) and long-lasting traumatic health risks (e.g., infertility, sexual problems, and labor complications)
(e.g., Berg and Underland, 2013; Obermeyer, 2005; Wagner, 2015; Whitehorn et al., 2002). Consequently, signicant
and increasing political eort has been made since the early 1990s at the international, national, and local levels to
eliminate FGC (e.g., UNFPA and UNICEF, 2014). The Sustainable Development Goals set by the United Nations
General Assembly in 2015 also include a specic target calling for the eradication of FGC by 2030 (Goal 5.3).
An implicit assumption underlying this global political eort is that the abandonment of FGC improves women's
welfare, although political interest appears to have outpaced the understanding of the implications of this practice.
On the one hand, eradicating FGC is likely to reduce unfavorable heath consequences for women. Indeed, the present
policy discourse is largely built on this consideration (Shell-Duncan, 2008). On the other hand, it has anecdotally been
mooted that FGC is required for a proper marriage in Africa (see Shell-Duncan and Hernlund, 2000 for an overview).
If FGC signals qualities of brides that grooms value, such as aesthetics, cleanliness, faithfulness, and virginity as
often referred to in anthropological and sociological studies and, thus, improves women's marriage prospects (e.g.,
Chesnokova and Vaithianathan, 2010), their welfare may not necessarily increase owning to the abandonment of FGC.
While an emerging body of economic research has recently begun exploring FGC (e.g., Bellemare et al., 2015;
Camilotti, 2015; Coyne and Coyne, 2014; Eerson et al., 2015; Poyker, 2018; Vogt et al., 2016), there is still a lack of
clarity on the welfare implications of this practice. To ll this knowledge gap, the present study explores whether and
how the abandonment of FGC is associated with women's marriage in the long term.
To address this question, rst, a simple model is developed to formalize the widely known theory of marriage
convention, as proposed outside the eld of economics by Mackie (1996). While recent studies both support and reject
the marriage convention hypothesis (e.g., Eerson et al., 2015; Hayford, 2005; Shell-Duncan et al., 2011), or even
doubt the idea of social convention (e.g., Bellemare et al., 2015), the decline in FGC in the well-known Senegalese
Tostan Project is still seen as proof of this hypothesis, and has attracted signicant interest from relevant policymakers
and practitioners (e.g., Diop and Askew, 2009; Mackie, 2000). Therefore, it is suggested that it can be meaningful to
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analyze the relationship between FGC and women's marriage based on this inuential theory.
Mackie (1996) proposed a conceptual game-theoretic framework to explain the presence of FGC, wherein this prac-
tice persists as a social convention in Africa's typical intra-marrying communities when men believe that uncircumcised
women are not faithful and women believe that men will not marry uncircumcised women. This insight suggests that
FGC corresponds to a within-economics concept of \social norms" as dened in Young (2008, 2015) (and adopted in
the present study), namely a group-level behavior that is maintained as one of multiple self-enforcing equilibria in a
suitably dened game, and as particularly supported by women's motive to coordinate marital transaction.
To formalize this idea, the present study develops a normal-form game with two agents, i.e., men and women (or
their parents), who play in an intra-marrying community, whereby women compete with each other when seeking
their marital partners. In this game, when the health-impairment costs of FGC are not particularly large, two stable
pure strategy Nash equilibria, i.e., FGC and no-FGC equilibria, arise, wherein all (no) females in a community are
circumcised in the former (latter). The FGC equilibrium is inferior to the no-FGC equilibrium because community
members in the former incur the cost of FGC impairing women's health, which reduces a community's total welfare.
Circumcised women solely suer from the costly FGC if they fail to get married. Thus, a woman normally hesitates
to undergo FGC. However, she may decide to do so if men compensate her by providing more livelihood support when
she marries. This compensation facilitates \all" women to undergo FGC in the FGC equilibrium. Consequently,
married (unmarried) women's welfare is larger (smaller) in the FGC equilibrium than that in the no-FGC equilibrium.
According to the model, the abandonment of FGC implies a social change from the FGC to the no-FGC equi-
librium. For example, an increase in the cost of FGC as perceived by community members induces the equilibrium
shift. Because this shift keeps couples randomly matched in marriage markets with respect to an FGC decision, the
abandonment of FGC would exhibit no relationship with female marriage probability. However, its consequence for
married women's welfare is ambiguous. First, this equilibrium shift may reduce their welfare by eliminating the afore-
mentioned compensation given to them in the FGC equilibrium. That said, if the health-impairment costs of FGC
(and, thus, the corresponding compensation) were previously negligible, married women's welfare would not change
in a signicant manner. Furthermore, if people previously undervalued the costs of FGC due to cognitive limitations,
it is also possible that married women's welfare would improve.
The theoretical analysis yields two important implications for the subsequent empirical analysis. First, no causal
relationship between FGC and women's marriage is likely to exist in the long term. Second, people's perceptions
about the benets and costs of FGC causally determine these two practices in a simultaneous manner. These two
implications provide the motivation behind the present study to identify a policy shock that raises people's awareness
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about the costs of FGC (relative to its benets) and to empirically analyze the impacts of this shock on both FGC
and women's marriage (rather than examining the theoretically unlikely causal eects of FGC on women's marriage).
In its empirical analysis, this study exploits a unique setting characterized by two factors. First, Burkina Faso is
one of the pioneering African states engaging in the ght against FGC with a strong political commitment thereof
and success in reducing its prevalence (Colombo, 2013; Diop et al., 2008; UNFPA, 2010). Second, most of Africa's
national boundaries were arbitrarily drawn during colonial times and often partition people belonging to one ethnic
group, and, thus, the same culture is often shared in two or more countries (e.g., Herbst, 1989; see also Zartman, 1965
for West Africa). Consequently, cross-border social interactions such as marriage and market meetings commonly take
place in this region. Taken together, it is hypothesized that Burkina Faso's political eorts increased the relative cost
of FGC as perceived by those who reside in communities (located close to Burkina Faso) of its neighboring countries
due to cross-border social interactions and the resulting FGC-relevant knowledge spillovers, while reducing the rate of
FGC in the borderlands. My eld observations in one of these borderlands also supported this possibility.
Accordingly, exploiting data pertaining to female respondents aged 15?49 drawn from multiple rounds of the
Standard Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) in four countries bordering Burkina Faso, i.e., Benin (2001, 2011?
12), Co^te d'Ivoire (1998?99, 2011?12), Mali (2001, 2006, 2012?13), and Togo (2013?14), this study compares the
prevalence of FGC between communities located close to Burkina Faso and the inland communities before and after
this country engaged in political eorts to eradicate FGC. Because such eorts have been expended since 1990, the
data permit analysis of policy consequences on FGC and women's marital outcomes more than 20 years later.
The ndings yielded by this dierence-in-dierences (DID) approach are consistent with the view that the practice
of FGC declined in borderlands due to spillover eects stemming from Burkina Faso's political eorts. This con-
clusion is robust to alternative controls (e.g., border conict, household xed eects), linear time trends specic to
each community, analyses exploiting separate sub-samples (e.g., each country, similar sub-groups), assessment of bias
attributable to unobservables (Oster, forthcoming), an alternative treatment indicator based on ethnic homelands by
Murdock (1959)'s classication, nonlinear model specications (i.e., logit, ordered logit), multiple-hypothesis testing,
selection concerns (i.e., health, relocation), and so on. Decline occurs fast; this century-old practice only started
to exhibit a downward trend in the past 20 years in the borderlands. In contrast, as revealed from a similar DID
approach, this external policy eort did not inuence the probability of young females forming a marital union, while
having no distinct adverse impacts on the resulting marital outcomes, as measured by a husband's education and age,
the number of co-wives, a spouse's ethnicity, family assets, intrahousehold decision-making (DM) power, likelihood of
intimate partner violence (IPV), and so on. This study also shows no noticeable changes in a range of health outcomes
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(e.g., genital problems) of young women residing in those borderlands.
The setting under study oers two striking advantages. First, in investigating the relationship between the aban-
donment of FGC and marriage, it is possible to explore the inuence of Burkina Faso's political eorts on its own
citizens. However, it is more dicult to dene treated groups and control for relevant endogeneity in this approach.
Because Burkina Faso's political eorts are external policy shocks to its neighboring countries, the cross-country na-
ture of the proposed analyses arguably facilitates causal identication. Second, one may challenge the accuracy of
self-reported FGC status because people may not tell the truth for fear of legal sanctions (e.g., De Cao and Lutz,
2018). FGC is not criminalized in Mali and laws against FGC are only weakly enforced by the remainder of Burkina
Faso's neighbors; therefore, this measurement concern is less serious in the present study, compared to within-country
analyses of the parties strictly outlawing this practice (e.g., Burkina Faso).12
Extant economic research aimed at understanding the role of FGC is scarce. Outside the eld of economics, the
systematic literature review performed by Berg and Denison (2012) also revealed a scarcity of methodologically robust
FGC-related empirical studies. Nevertheless, the present research is closely related to the following studies. First, while
Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010) theoretically analyzed dierences in marital outcomes between circumcised and
uncircumcised women within a community achieving ineciently high levels of cutting rates (i.e., FGC equilibrium
according to their denition), the present study focuses on a shift from an FGC to a no-FGC equilibrium.
Second, the present study also relates to several empirical studies that investigate whether FGC is a normative
equilibrium, within (e.g., Bellemare et al., 2015; Eerson et al., 2015) and outside the area of economics (e.g., Hayford,
2005; Shell-Duncan et al., 2011). In contrast to Bellemare et al. (2015), who analyzes people's willingness to continue
FGC in West Africa, the current research examines the actual behavior.3 While Eerson et al. (2015) conducted a
cross-sectional survey in Sudan covering 45 communities, the present study examines social changes in more than
3,000 communities in West Africa. This research complements the focus and ndings of these prior studies. While
other interpretations cannot be entirely ruled out, the ndings of the present study are not inconsistent with the view
that FGC is a normative equilibrium. Notably, the theoretical reasoning for this specic marriage-related practice
may also apply to some, if not all, elements of the theoretical mechanisms that maintain various normative modern
health-related practices (e.g., orthodontic treatment for children, plastic surgery), which are common in some countries
1Similar to prior studies (e.g., Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014), in the present study, it is presumed that law enforcement is
restricted \within" a country.
2Moreover, the exploited data enable the present study to investigate the \long-term" adjustment of marriage markets in the \regional"
context, which is indispensable not only for examining equilibrium dynamics but also for increasing the external validity of the ndings.
Furthermore, this study explores both extensive (e.g., likelihoods of FGC and marriage) and intensive (e.g., types of FGC and cutters,
marital outcomes) margins regarding the adjustment of relevant practices, which renders its ndings rich and comprehensive.
3The practice of FGC often continues among the ospring of mothers who oppose this practice (e.g., Carr, 1997, p. 55?56), and
according to UNICEF (2005a, p. 8), actual prevalence is the most important indicator for a situation analysis of FGC.
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but not in others, if those practices are related to male or female marriageability or success in life.
This study also exhibits similarities to previous studies that harness Africa's national boundaries as a source of
causal identication. However, unlike past research (e.g., Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014), it exploits one policy
originating from either side of the border as an exogenous shock to the other.4 This approach could be applied in other
settings, and may be more eective when the outcomes of interest are politically sensitive, and, thus, the research
ndings are not entirely reliable if the data drawn from a country that exactly implements the policy are analyzed.
Similar to several studies focusing on the inuence of political regimes (e.g., Lowes et al., 2017), wars (e.g., Voors
et al., 2012), and technology (e.g., Alesina et al., 2013), the research reported herein also explores the evolution of
\culture," including informal institutions, according to the denition of Alesina and Giuliano (2015). In contrast to
most empirical studies that regard culture as preferences/values internal to individuals (e.g., Guiso et al., 2006), this
study more explicitly refers to cultural change as an equilibrium shift. In this context, what is presented may be viewed
as a rare empirical example of testing the \swift" transition of a normative equilibrium, which has been indicated in
theory (e.g., Schelling, 2006) but suers from a dearth of evidence in the real-world setting (e.g., Munshi and Myaux,
2006). As addressed in the context of other marriage-related social institutions (e.g., Anderson and Bidner, 2015;
Jacoby and Mansuri, 2010; Tertilt, 2005), investigating cultural institutions, conceivably a form of social capital, is
also valuable because the relevant economic research reveals great scarcity, particularly in the developing world (Greif
and Iyigun, 2013, p. 534).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. To guide the empirical analyses, Section 2 develops a simple
model that formalizes Mackie (1996)'s theory of marriage convention. Following the theoretical implications, Section
3 provides the institutional background, referring to Burkina Faso's political eorts against FGC and its inuence on
neighboring countries. The empirical strategy and data overview are presented in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively.
Section 6 describes the empirical ndings, with concluding remarks provided in Section 7.
2 Mackie (1996)'s theory of marriage convention
In this section, a simple model is developed to formalize Mackie (1996)'s seminal theory of marriage convention.
The purpose is to clarify the long-term relationship between the abandonment of FGC and women's marriage while
providing useful implications for this study's empirical analyses. The relevant propositions are proved in Section S.1
in the supplemental appendix.
4In previous studies, it is assumed that as borders have randomly allocated people to dierent-country treatments, dierences in
outcomes across the border can be interpreted as the local eects of treatments such as political institutions; see also Mccauley and Posner
(2015) for the tenability of this assumption.
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Mackie (1996) asserted that FGC persists in Africa's typical intra-marrying communities when men believe that
uncircumcised women are not faithful and women believe that men will not marry uncircumcised women. He regarded
FGC as a social convention supported as a coordination failure and, thus, claimed that assembling a critical mass
of people who publicly pledge to stop FGC (e.g., creation of an anti-FGC association) is important to eradicate this
normative practice (i.e., tipping-point theory). However, he separately discussed these two issues by referring to a
simple game matrix (see Figure 1 of Mackie, 1996) for the former and by exploiting Schelling (2006)'s (Chapter 7)
coordination diagram (see Figure 2 of Mackie, 1996) for the latter. However, the coordination diagram does not
necessarily clearly explain how circumcised women coordinate their marriage. The following model attempts to unify
these two perspectives into a single framework as simply as possible.5
Consider a normal-form game describing an intra-marrying community, whereby women compete with each other,
with no search friction, when seeking their marital partners, as implicitly presumed by Mackie (1996). To take this
competition into account in the simplest manner, the ratio of men to women is p 2 (0; 1), and the size of the male
population is normalized as one. Men (agent m) and women (agent w) are assumed to have homogeneous preferences.
In addition, two marriage-related customs, i.e., FGC or something else, exist in this community.
In this game, a man decides whether and to whom he proposes, and if he proposes, the amount of livelihood support
g  0 that he will provide to a woman during marital life. If he decides to propose to a circumcised (uncircumcised)
woman, he chooses endogenously determined gc (g0). When a man does not make a proposal, he chooses exogenously
determined gs (= 0), which makes him (and so, women) remain single. In contrast, a woman (or her parents) decides
whether to undergo circumcision (action k), whereby k = kc if she is circumcised and k = k0 otherwise, and then
selects her response z to the proposal; this response includes either \accept and marry (m)" or \reject and stay single
(s)." Consequently, the strategy prole taken by both men and women can be characterized as (g, k, z).
The corresponding payos vi(; ; ) of an agent i (either m or w) are demonstrated as follows:
vm(gs; kc;m) = vm(gs; kc; s) = vm(gc; kc; s) = vm(g0; kc;m) = vm(g0; kc; s) = 0; (1)
vm(gs; k0;m) = vm(gs; k0; s) = vm(g0; k0; s) = vm(gc; k0;m) = vm(gc; k0; s) = 0; (2)
vm(gc; kc;m) = b  gc; (3)
vm(g0; k0;m) = (1  )b  g0; (4)
5It would also be possible to show multiple equilibria regarding the practice of FGC, which will be shown below, by utilizing a signaling
model (e.g., Spence, 1973). However, this complication is avoided here, as one goal of this section is to replicate Mackie (1996)'s original idea
in a more formal manner, which does not assume any heterogeneity and the associated imperfect information, and to generate theoretical
implications useful for this study's empirical analyses. Relatedly, if pure coordination, as proposed in Mackie (1996), maintains FGC, social
pressure exerted by community members on those who reject FGC is not required to sustain this practice.
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vw(gs; kc;m) = vw(gs; kc; s) = vw(gc; kc; s) = vw(g0; kc;m) = vw(g0; kc; s) =  c; (5)
vw(gs; k0;m) = vw(gs; k0; s) = vw(g0; k0; s) = vw(gc; k0;m) = vw(gc; k0; s) = 0; (6)
vw(gc; kc;m) = gc   c; (7)
vw(g0; k0;m) = g0; (8)
Whether the marriage-related custom is FGC or not, men are assumed to believe that women conforming to a
community's major custom are faithful, and obtain b ((1   )b) by marrying circumcised (uncircumcised) women,
whereby b > 0 is exogenous and  2 [0; 1] is the fraction of circumcised women in a community.6 This fraction is
endogenously determined by women's choice of k. When  = 0:8, for example, men who marry circumcised women
obtain higher utility than those who marry uncircumcised women by 0:6b (= 0:8b   0:2b). This utility premium is
zero if there is no majority custom (i.e.,  = 0:5). It is assumed that married men receive no utility other than this
premium, which simplies the analysis. Both men and women obtain reservation utility normalized at the level of
zero when they remain single. The practice of FGC and the resulting health impairment make women less productive
and, thus, reduce their utility by the exogenous amount of c > 0 during both married and single life.7
Assuming c = c0 and dening ~c0  c0p , it can be shown that
Proposition 1 When the cost of FGC is not particularly large (i.e., b > ~c0), the strategy proles (gc = ~c0; kc;m) and
(g0 = 0; k0;m) are stable Nash equilibria, along with the equilibrium levels of utility vm = b   ~c0, vw = ~c0   c0 for
married women, and vw =  c0 for unmarried women in the former, whereas vm = b and vw = 0 for both married
and unmarried women in the latter.
There are two stable pure strategy Nash equilibria, whereby all women are circumcised in the prole (gc = ~c0; kc;m)
(FGC equilibrium achieving the circumcised fraction of  = 1) and uncircumcised in the prole (g0 = 0; k0;m) (no-FGC
equilibrium achieving the circumcised fraction of  = 0); see also Figure 1.
Once the FGC equilibrium arises as a social norm due to historical accident (see Mackie, 1996), it becomes a
uniquely salient or focal solution to the relevant game. In the FGC equilibrium, a man has no incentive to marry
uncircumcised women because he believes that they are unfaithful, and, thus, such a marriage provides him with lower
utility than the current one. A woman also has no incentive to refuse FGC because (she believes that) no man will
propose to uncircumcised women. The FGC equilibrium is inferior to the no-FGC equilibrium because shifting from
6More generally, a benet arising from a social custom is felt more strongly as the number of people adhering to the custom increases, as
presupposed in prior studies (e.g. Lindbeck, 1997; Lindbeck et al., 1999). See also Rege (2004) for the validity of this type of assumption.
7This reduced productivity may also decrease men's utility in marital life when they marry circumcised women. Explicitly considering
this cost in the model does not aect the key theoretical implications.
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the former to the latter improves the total welfare enjoyed by all community members from b   ~c0 to b.8 Therefore,
the existence of both the FGC and the no-FGC equilibrium reects a coordination problem. The proposition 1 also
implies that a community tends to reveal the cutting rate of either one or zero. This discontinuity of the cutting rate
across communities is conrmed in the analyzed DHS data; see subsection S.6.1 in the supplemental appendix.
In addition, when  is just below (above) b+~c02b , as indicated from the proof of proposition 1, a community converges
to the no-FGC equilibrium (FGC equilibrium). Thus, if more than b ~c02b (= 1  b+~c02b ) fraction of women do not undergo
FGC, a shift from the FGC to the no-FGC equilibrium is achieved in a self-enforcing manner. Following Schelling
(2006), therefore, Mackie (1996) claims that organizing a group that includes a critical minimum number of people
who refuse FGC and make it visible to the public are necessary for the eradication of this practice. Because b ~c02b <
1
2 , this group does not necessarily have to include most of the female community members.
In this study's empirical analysis, it is hypothesized that Burkina Faso's political eorts increased the utility cost
of FGC perceived by those residing in communities of its neighboring countries located close to Burkina Faso, from
c0 to c1 > c0, due to cross-border social interactions and the resulting spillovers of FGC-related health and political
knowledge. Accordingly,
Proposition 2 When b < ~c1  c1p , the strategy prole (gc = 0; k0;m) is a stable Nash equilibrium, along with the
equilibrium levels of utility vm = b and vw = 0 for both married and unmarried women.
In response to the increase in perceived utility cost, all women refrain from FGC. In reality, however, only a fraction
of community members might have obtained new knowledge on FGC and updated their perception of its cost. Nev-
ertheless, if a great mass of people exceeding the critical threshold refuse FGC, a community tips over to the no-FGC
equilibrium in a self-enforcing manner.
On the one hand, the transition to a new equilibrium would keep the likelihood of women's marriage at the level
of p before and after this social change takes place, because the number of men available in the market is constant.
On the other hand, this transition could reduce married women's utility from ~c0  c0 = (1 p)c0p to zero. The reasoning
goes as follows. In competitive marriage markets in which women fail to get married with a positive probability, they
solely suer from the costly FGC unless they successfully nd marital partners. Then, to encourage \all" women to
undergo FGC, men in the FGC equilibrium would have to provide married women with more livelihood support than
men in the no-FGC equilibrium, in compensation for the health-impairment costs of FGC. Thus, the aforementioned
prediction that married women's utility may decline as a result of the equilibrium shift is ascribed to the disappearance
8The total welfare in the FGC equilibrium is (b   ~c0) + 1p (p(~c0   c0) + (1  p)( c0)) = b   ~c0. The total welfare in the no-FGC
equilibrium would easily be checked in a similar manner.
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of this compensation, which in turn raises married men's welfare from b  ~c0 to b. While unmarried women's welfare
increases from  c0 to zero due to the avoidance of FGC, and the total welfare enjoyed by all community members also
improves from b   ~c0 to b, the asymmetric consequence of the abandonment of FGC on married men's and women's
welfare is not highlighted in Mackie (1996) and may serve as an important caution for those who believe that the
eradication of FGC improves \all" women's welfare.
However, the model also suggests that married women's welfare loss may not be particularly large when the cost
of FGC was previously negligible (i.e., c0  0). Moreover, the perceived and actual costs of FGC may be dierent
due to cognitive limitations. In fact, people often believe that FGC encourages fertility and, thus, is a good tradition
(UNFPA, 2010). If the perceived cost is c0 despite the true cost of c1, for example, married women's welfare may
increase in step with the abandonment of FGC from ~c0   c1 to 0 (when c0 > pc1). These arguments suggest that
the long-term relationship between the abandonment of FGC and changes in married women's welfare is a priori
ambiguous,9 which makes this study's empirical endeavors worthwhile.
Most importantly, Mackie (1996)'s insights provide two important implications for the empirical exercises conducted
herein. First, no causal relationship between FGC and women's marriage exists in the long term. Second, the
underlying factors (e.g., b, c, p) simultaneously determine these two practices. Therefore, this study separately
estimates impacts of the external policy shock attributed to Burkina Faso's political eorts on the practices of FGC
and marriage in the borderlands of its neighboring countries.
[Here, Figure 1]
3 Burkina Faso: politics and spillover eects
The underlying assumption to estimate the aforementioned impacts is that Burkina Faso's political eorts raised
people's awareness about the relative cost of FGC (subsection 3.1), and that its impacts permeated the borderlands of
its neighboring countries due to cross-border social interactions (subsection 3.2). Referring to the relevant literature
and my eld survey, this section discusses this assumption.
3.1 Prohibition of FGC in Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso is a landlocked nation in West Africa bordered by six countries, namely, Benin, Co^te d'Ivoire, Ghana,
Mali, Niger, and Togo (see Figure S.1 in the supplemental appendix). While the prevalence of FGC is clearly high
9If men's behavior, including the amount of marital support, is regulated by their societies, it is also possible to show that all women's
welfare increases as a result of this equilibrium shift while keeping men's welfare constant, depending upon the parameter values.
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according to 2010 DHS data (approximately 76% among women aged 15 to 49), this country has exhibited a strong
desire to eradicate this practice for more than two decades, as follows (e.g., Chikhungu and Madise, 2015; Colombo,
2013; UNFPA, 2010; United States Department of State, 2001).
In 1990, the National Committee to Fight against the Practice of Excision (CNLPE) was established through
presidential decree. Under the directorship of the Permanent Secretariat, this body has overseen all country-wide
actions against FGC since its establishment while maintaining autonomy in its activities. To raise public awareness
about the harmful health consequences of FGC, the CNLPE has undertaken various activities (e.g., workshops)
involving religious/traditional leaders, police, medical experts, and organizations for youth and women. It has also
exploited public media such as radio as well as succeeded in including a module on FGC in the national school
curriculum and training teachers on this practice (28 TOO MANY, 2015).
The passage of legislation prohibiting FGC in 1996 may be seen as a landmark of these political eorts. This
law is considered one of the toughest on the entire African continent and has systematically been enforced since its
enactment (UNFPA, 2014).10 Relatedly, the CNLPE's actions include the promotion of a national telephone hotline
called the \Green Phone: SOS Excision." This hotline was instituted in 1990 to denounce cutters as well as parents
and others who force girls to undergo FGC. This hotline was also utilized by those who detected instances of FGC
being forcibly performed and, thus, sought advice in identifying and securing the relevant authoritative interventions.
To increase its eectiveness, special patrols have also been deployed in 17 provinces characterized by a high prevalence
of FGC. As a result, a gradual increase in convictions from 94 in 1997?2005 to 646 in 2005?2009 is reported (28
TOO MANY, 2015).
Due to these strenuous political eorts, Burkina Faso has been recognized as taking a leading position against FGC
in Africa (Colombo, 2013; Diop et al., 2008).11 Indeed, the rate of decline in FGC in this country appears to be greater
than in other African countries commonly practicing FGC such as Benin, Central African Republic, Co^te d'Ivoire,
Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Guinea, Kenya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, and Sudan (see Figure 18 of UNICEF,
2005b). Of these countries, the proportion of women who have at least one circumcised daughter and believe that
10The penal code, which sentences anyone who harms female genital organs by means of ablation, excision, inbulation, numbing, or
any other means, includes six months' to three years' imprisonment and/or a ne ranging from CFA francs 150,000 to 900,000 (about
255 to 1530 USD based on the exchange rate at the end of October 2018) (Article 380). This ne is considerable in monetary terms
given that Burkina Faso's gross national income per capita (by the World Bank Atlas method) was only 610 USD in 2017 (see http:
//databank.worldbank.org/data/download/GNIPC.pdf.) Further, prison terms can be extended to between ve and ten years if the
procedure causes death. If the guilty party is a medical professional, the maximum punishment will be applied and the court can
additionally prohibit them from practicing their profession for a maximum of ve years (Article 381). A ne of CFA francs 50,000 to
100,000 (about 85 to 170 USD) will also be imposed on all people who have knowledge of the criminal behavior described in Article 380
and fail to notify the proper authorities of incidents (Article 382).
11Burkina Faso is also one of the countries that provide medical services for women who have undergone FGC. Since 2009, all district
and regional hospitals have developed the skills of health providers vis-a-vis treating the injuries caused by this practice (UNFPA, 2014).
In 2008, the UNFPA and UNICEF also implemented a joint program aimed at accelerating the abandonment of FGC in this country
(UNFPA and UNICEF, 2014).
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this practice should continue is also the smallest in Burkina Faso (see Figure 19 of UNICEF, 2005b). These ndings
indicate people's growing tendency to abandon FGC in this country. Burkina Faso's \nationwide" political eort
might have successfully prompted a sucient number of people crossing a crucial group-threshold to stop FGC.
3.2 External inuence on border communities in neighboring countries
As Shell-Duncan and Hernlund (2000) (p. 7) notes, \National boundaries (in Africa) are not all important, ? as
the distribution of genital cutting is better understood by ethnic groups, and groups practicing genital cutting often
straddle national boundaries." As somewhat reected in this remark, the practices of FGC and marriage in (rural)
Africa are typically performed within the same ethnic group, and ethnic groups often spread across national borders.
Ethnic groups stretching over multiple countries exists because Africa's national borders were drawn during colonial
periods by Europeans with limited knowledge of or concern for social and linguistic groups (e.g., Herbst, 1989). While
parts of national boundaries in West Africa consist of segments on rivers (e.g., Black Volta between Burkina Faso
and Co^te d'Ivoire), most of them are still based on the colonial administrative divisions of French West Africa, which
were determined with no precise knowledge of human or physical geography (e.g., Zartman, 1965; see also Brownie,
1979 for details of the respective national boundaries). The partitioned measure of \articial states," which highlights
ethnic features of state articiality, is also quite high in the aforementioned six countries bordering Burkina Faso (see
Table 7 of Alesina et al., 2011).
This partition of ethnic groups makes cross-border social interactions reasonably common in Africa (e.g., Lesser
and Moise-Leeman, 2009; Meagher, 2003); therefore, this social interaction might have enabled a body of FGC-related
health and political knowledge acquired by Burkinabe people to be introduced into the borderlands of neighboring
countries, thus raising the cost of FGC (relative to its benet) as perceived by those border residents.
To assess whether such knowledge spillovers are possible, in February 2016, I conducted a semi-structured questionnaire-
based survey in 13 villages (including one sub-village) in Wa West, a district in northwest Ghana located very close to
the Burkina Faso border (see the green polygon in Figure S.1 in the supplemental appendix for the location).12 The
surveyed communities were primarily settled by the Dagaaba and Lobi, ethnic groups that spread over Burkina Faso
and Ghana and used to practice FGC.
12The decision to select Ghana for the eld survey was informed by several concerns including security, research budget, and translation.
In this survey, I collected qualitative information on people's practices relevant to FGC, marriage, and sexual behavior. While neither
villages nor respondents were randomly selected (i.e., convenience sampling), this approach nevertheless secured 26 eective interviews
conducted with 11 male and 15 female adult respondents. Among the respondents were members of four ethnic groups (the Dagaaba, Lobi,
Senu, and Wala); four respondents were ex-traditional cutters for girls and ve respondents (including three ex-traditional cutters for girls)
were either ex- or present cutters for boys. The duration of each interview was approximately 30?60 minutes. To ensure condentiality
and to maximize data reliability, the interviews were conducted in an environment where the respondent was alone with two research
assistants (for translation to and from local languages) and me.
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While the nature of convenience sampling precludes generalizing ndings from this eld survey, three points are
still noted. First, the interviews revealed that people in a community on one side of the two countries frequently had
contact with those in a community on the other side through marriage and market meetings.13 Second, interviewees
often noted how FGC had declined in the surveyed area because people had learned that this practice complicated
childbirth (although they had previously believed that the opposite was true). This view is consistent with that held
by the Permanent Secretary of the CNLPE (UNFPA, 2010). According to the Secretary, informing people of the
complications during childbirth attributable to FGC has thus far been seen as more eective in altering Burkinabe
people's hearts and minds, rather than emphasizing the human rights perspective of the practice. This is because they
cherish children and, thus, are particularly concerned about their reproductive health.14
Third, one Dagaaba ex-cutter mentioned that she received an oer to perform FGC from Burkinabe parents (one
year before the interview), although she rejected this oer. This nding indicates that the strong law in Burkina Faso
could have conceivably served to encourage Burkinabe parents to take their daughters to other countries for the purpose
of FGC, in which laws prohibiting FGC do not exist or the enforcement of such laws is not so strict. Consistently,
it is reported that the following ethnic groups moved across national boundaries to get their daughters circumcised
while avoiding Burkina Faso's law enforcement (Sayagues, 2009): the Dagaaba and Lobi spread between Burkina Faso
and Ghana; the Mossi and Yagse moved across Burkina Faso and Mali; and the Fulani and Gourmantche distributed
between Burkina Faso and Niger. On the one hand, these ndings suggest that FGC is so deeply entrenched in society
that it is dicult to eradicate this practice. On the other hand, due to social interaction, people living outside Burkina
Faso might be aware and concerned that FGC is a costly practice involving criminalization and legal punishment.1516
4 Empirical strategy
This study examines the impacts of Burkina Faso's policy eort on the practices of FGC and marriage involving
people residing in the borderlands of its neighboring countries, rather than on these outcomes for Burkinabe citizens.
13For example, one Burkinabe woman who had married into Ghana returned to her natal home at least three times per month to take
care of her elderly mother. Burkinabe women may also visit markets and utilize health-care services in Ghana. People simply crossed the
border by boat (rainy season) or on foot (dry season) without formal immigration procedures.
14Similarly, an elderly Burkinabe woman residing in Wa West informed me that cross-border social interactions and the resultant
knowledge spillovers might have succeeded in making FGC obsolete in the surveyed communities before penalties for FGC prescribed in
Ghana's law became more serious in 2007.
15In my interview, one ex-cutter (for girls) heard of cases where the police had arrested Burkinabe cutters practicing FGC.
16The FGC-induced inux of Burkinabe people to the borderlands of Burkina Faso's neighboring countries might also have increased
the cost of FGC for two other reasons and thereby reduced its local prevalence. First, as people pay fees for cutting, local prices of FGC
might have risen due to increasing demand for the service. Second, increasing demand for the services provided by cutters in neighboring
countries may have raised the local cost of searching for available cutters. In my eld survey, I found one Ghanaian male cutter (for
boys), who regularly stayed in Burkina Faso for a month and practiced male circumcision in several communities, because Burkinbe people
requested his skills. When he is away, Ghanaian people would have to identify alternative cutters. Despite these possibilities, however, in
the survey, I did not nd any current (for boys) or ex-cutters (for girls) who had charged higher prices for cutting in response to increasing
demand for their services. Rather, they sometimes gave a discount to poor parents. In addition, it would not be particularly bothersome
for people to postpone cutting for a short period of time because of the transient unavailability of cutters.
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Burkina Faso is not analyzed here for two reasons. First, because FGC in Burkina Faso is prevalent across almost all
regions and ethnic groups, and its policy eort likely aected most of its citizens, it is dicult to dene an appropriate
treatment group within this country as well as to address the relevant endogeneity. Second, Burkina Faso strictly
criminalizes FGC, and as a result, its citizens may not report their FGC status truthfully. While a few studies support
the reliability of self-reported FGC data (e.g., Morison et al., 2001), most prior studies found inconsistency between
self-reported and clinically determined FGC, while casting doubt on the self-reported information regarding FGC
status (e.g., Klouman et al., 2005; Snow et al., 2002), FGC types (e.g., Elmusharaf et al., 2006), and attitudes toward
FGC (e.g., De Cao and Lutz, 2018). According to Jackson et al. (2003)'s study of Ghana, which is closely related to
the present context, 13% of women who reported in 1995 that they had been circumcised stated that they had not
been circumcised when they were re-interviewed in 2000 after the government banned FGC, for example. Thus, this
measurement concern has often facilitated researchers to acknowledge the limitation of their studies (e.g., Bellemare
et al., 2015) or to innovate a new means to measure FGC status (e.g., Eerson et al., 2015).17 By analyzing Burkina
Faso's policy impacts that spill over to its neighboring countries, whereby FGC is not criminalized or laws against
FGC are weakly enforced compared to Burkina Faso, the present study attempts to overcome these issues eectively.
To estimate the impacts of interest, this study uses data drawn from multiple rounds of the Standard DHS
conducted in Burkina Faso's neighboring countries, namely Benin (2001, 2011?12), Co^te d'Ivoire (1998?99, 2011?
12), Mali (2001, 2006, 2012?13), and Togo (2013?14). Ghana and Niger were excluded from the analysis for the
reasons described in Section 5. More precisely, for a female i living in a community j that was born in year t, this
study estimates the following equation by the ordinary least squares (OLS):18
yijt = 1 + 2Dijt Bj + 3xijt + vj + t + ijt; (9)
where yijt is outcomes of interest (e.g., FGC, marital outcomes); Dijt is a dummy variable that equals one if the
timing of FGC as determined by her society falls within the period of Burkina Faso's political eorts against FGC,
else zero; Bj is another dummy that equals one for communities situated in the vicinity of the border to Burkina Faso,
else zero; xijt contains other determinants of outcomes specic to her and her household (i.e., birth order, religion, and
17Eerson et al. (2015)'s study of Sudan relied on henna applied to circumcised girls' feet for assessing the respondents' FGC status.
18This research exploits the OLS for three reasons. First, this technique enables statistical inference without having a strong distributional
assumption about the error term. Second, it is possible to provide a straightforward interpretation for the interaction term coecients (Ai
and Norton, 2003). Third, it facilitates causal identication through controlling for numerous community-level xed eects.
14
country-ethnicity indicators categorized into 28 groups), including year-of-interview xed eects;1920 vj is a dummy
for each community; t is year-of-birth xed eects; and ijt represents stochastic error.
Because age at FGC varies across and (to a lesser extent) within societies, there is no a priori age threshold for
dening Dijt. However, this study presumes that this variable equals one if the respondent was born in or after
1990 for two reasons. First, as described above, the CNLPE was established in 1990. On the other hand, the mean
age at FGC among the circumcised respondents residing close to Burkina Faso (e.g., within a 30-km distance to the
national border) is 6.75 years. Therefore, it is possible that Burkina Faso's political eorts aected the practice of FGC
performed by respondents born before 1990. However, political eorts seem to have been stronger since legislation
against FGC was introduced in 1996 and went into eect in February 1997. Considering this timing and the mean
age at FGC, which constitute the second reason, exploiting 1990 as the threshold year seems reasonable.
Similarly, no a priori criteria exist to facilitate the dening of communities as being located \close" to Burkina
Faso. In the benchmark specication, this study refers to communities situated within a 30-km distance from the
national border to Burkina Faso as Bj = 1. The sensitivity of the empirical ndings to alternative threshold years
and distances to the national boundary will be explored in Section S.3 in the supplemental appendix.
Somewhat relatedly, as the DHS provides locational information on respondents' present communities only, this
study needs to assume that respondents currently live in places located close to their residential areas (likely in
childhood/puberty), where FGC might have taken place. Women's relocation to \nearby" villages at the time of
marriage is common in patrilineal African societies, which does not critically invalidate this assumption. In addition,
the identication strategy is still robust to this concern provided the relevant measurement error does not systematically
dier between borderlands and inlands. Nevertheless, these issues will be more carefully analyzed in subsection 6.4.
In the present study, it may be plausible to cluster standard errors at the level of marriage markets, likely charac-
terized by both the respondents' ethnicity and residential areas, which facilitates two-way clustering (e.g., Cameron
et al., 2011). However, ethnic groups in the DHS are not necessarily categorized in a consistent manner across countries
and even across the survey rounds within the same country (see also footnote 19). Consequently, after controlling
for the community xed eects and the country-ethnicity xed eects, the main empirical model exploits standard
errors robust to heteroscedasticity and clustered at the community level (3021 communities; see Figure S.1 in the
supplemental appendix for the locations). Rare exceptions to this rule due to computational diculties are specically
19For each country, ethnic groups were categorized for consistency across the survey rounds, which resulted in 10 groups for Benin, two
groups for Co^te d'Ivoire, 10 groups for Mali, and six groups for Togo. Also, note that the DHS does not necessarily categorize ethnic
groups in a consistent manner across countries. Thus, this study exploits the relevant xed eects at the country-ethnicity level. However,
the community xed eects still control for attributes specic to areas settled by particular ethnic groups.
20Information on respondents' birth order was unavailable in all rounds of the Benin DHS and the 1998?99 DHS of Co^to d'Ivoire. For
these rounds, the sample average (3.35) was applied.
15
noted below. While this approach is identical to that of Bellemare et al. (2015)'s study of FGC in West Africa, this
study will also check the robustness of the ndings to dierent levels of clustering in Section S.3.
The key identication assumption underlying the DID specication (9) is that in the absence of political eorts
by Burkina Faso, the outcomes of interest in the borderland and inlands would have followed parallel trends. After
separating the respondent females into those living in communities within a 30-km distance from the national border
to Burkina Faso and those in the remaining communities, Figure 2 plots the fraction of circumcised women by country
and year of birth (three-year cohort), with the vertical line indicating the 1990?92 cohort. This gure presents the
post-1966 fraction because the annual number of females born before 1966 was small, particularly in the borderlands.21
Two points are noted. First, it may be dicult to gain a good insight into the parallel trends from Benin, as the
annual number of women born in the border communities therein in each year was minor due to small sample size,
and, thus, the circumcised proportions uctuate year by year (even if three years of birth are treated as one group in
this gure). However, in the remaining countries, a similar trend in terms of circumcised proportions was observed
between the border and inland communities, up until around 1990. A more formal test described in Section S.2 in the
supplemental appendix also provided no evidence undermining the parallel-trend assumption in the years preceding
1990. Second, it appears that the circumcised proportion in the borderlands has declined in all countries since around
1990. This nding may indicate that the practice of FGC declined in those areas due to Burkina Faso's political eorts
and the resultant knowledge spillovers. The DID approach jointly tests this spillover assumption and its consequences.
[Here, Figure 2]
5 Data
Repeated cross-sectional data are utilized that are drawn from multiple rounds of the DHS in Benin (2001, 2011?12),
Co^te d'Ivoire (1998?99, 2011?12), Mali (2001, 2006, 2012?13), and Togo (2013?14). This survey was designed to
provide nationally representative information in the elds of population, health, and nutrition.22 In all survey rounds,
a similar two-stage sampling protocol was exploited, including the rst-stage selection of communities (clusters) from
the population census, followed by the second-stage selection of households from the respective communities. As all
women aged between 15 and 49 years in each selected household are interviewed, this sample design enabled the present
study to analyze 82,765 female respondents residing in 52,049 households located in 3,021 communities (see Table S.2
in the supplemental appendix for a country-round breakdown). While it was initially envisaged that the three most
21The mean circumcised proportion is approximately 14%, 44%, 90%, and 9% in Benin, Co^te d'Ivoire, Mali, and Togo, respectively.
22Data and relevant documents are publicly available at http://dhsprogram.com/data/available-datasets.cfm.
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recent rounds of the Standard DHS would be exploited in all six countries surrounding Burkina Faso, this approach
was abandoned because required data (i.e., the respondents' engagement in FGC, a community's GPS coordinates)
are not always available.23 In the data set, the birth year of females ranges from 1948 to 1999.
For the sample females born before [panel (A)] and after 1990 [panel (B)], summary statistics for several variables
are reported in Table 1, along with tests for equality of means between those residing within a 30-km distance to
Burkina Faso (112 communities) and the remaining respondents (2,909 communities). As this study examines the
inuence of the abandonment of FGC on women's entry into their rst marriage, the variables characterized as y
and z correspond to respondents aged 25 or younger, and married females in that age cohort, respectively. In this
young cohort, the likelihood of being widowed or divorced is minimal; therefore, the married/unmarried distinction
is simplied to a married/single dichotomy, which facilitates eective analysis of respondents' entry into their rst
marriage.24 For this reason as well as because the collected information somewhat diers by round and country, the
number of observations in Table 1 varies across the reported variables.
The circumcised proportion of respondents born before 1990 was signicantly higher in the border communities
at 71%, compared to 58% in the inland communities. However, this dierence disappeared after 1990 due to a more
pronounced reduction in the circumcised fraction in the borderlands, which resulted in about a 40% prevalence in both
areas. The radical form of FGC, known as inbulation, or pharaonic circumcision (\sewn closed"), is not particularly
common in the surveyed areas, and the practice of FGC is predominantly performed by traditional cutters, leaving
limited space for health-care professionals regarding this operation.25 Before 1990, approximately 8% ( 0:040:58 ) of
circumcised females were inbulated and approximately 89% ( 0:520:58 ) of this practice was performed by traditional
cutters. The mean age at FGC of the respondents born before 1990 is 6.83 years, and approximately 83% of the
circumcised females undergo the practice before reaching the age of 11 years. While the age at FGC does not
signicantly dier between the border and the inland communities both before and after 1990, it has declined over
time from 6.83 to 5.94 years on average. A similar tendency of declining age at FGC is reported in other countries such
as Senegal (Shell-Duncan et al., 2011) and The Gambia (Hernlund, 2000), for example. As young children raise less
suspicion about and speak out less against criminal activities, it is argued that the introduction of a law criminalizing
23While the 2003 DHS in Ghana provided information on both the FGC and GPS coordinates, these data are excluded from the analysis.
This is because the DHS respondents are aged 15?49 and, thus, this round did not include an eective post-treatment sample that could
have conceivably been aected by Burkina Faso's political eorts.
24In this age cohort, only 2% of respondents were identied as \formerly married," 41% were \never married," and 55% \currently
married."
25The World Health Organization has classied FGC into four types since 1996. Type I is the \partial or total removal of the clitoris
and/or the prepuce" (clitoridectomy). Type II is the \partial or total removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, with or without excision
of the labia majora" (excision). Type III is the \narrowing of the vaginal orice with creation of a covering seal by cutting and appositioning
the labia minora and/or the labia majora, with or without excision of the clitoris" (inbulation). Type IV is \all other harmful procedures
to the female genitalia for non-medical purposes" (e.g., pricking, piercing, incising, scraping, and cauterization).
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FGC, taken together with the resulting incentives for parents to seek FGC in secrecy, has facilitated this tendency
toward a lower age (Camilotti, 2015; Shell-Duncan et al., 2013).
Respondents in the borderlands are less educated, engage more pronouncedly in polygynous relationships, and
(if born before 1990) exhibit higher likelihoods of entering into marriages and producing children at a young age,
compared to the corresponding inland respondents. However, no statistically signicant dierence is observed between
the border and the inland communities with respect to the age at rst sexual intercourse. The border respondents
formed a marital union with younger and less educated husbands compared to the inland respondents. A family's
wealth index in the borderlands, which is a composite measure of a household's cumulative living standard, and which
ranges from one to ve, is smaller than that in the inland communities.26 Together these ndings suggest that the
borderlands, which are also more rural, are economically less advanced than the inlands.
[Here, Table 1]
6 Empirical ndings
6.1 FGC
Estimated impacts on FGC are reported in Table 2. By interacting a dummy for communities located close to Burkina
Faso with dierent birth cohorts (the reference group is respondents born before 1965), the most exible specication
of equation (9) was estimated in column (a). A signicant decline in cutting rates in the borderlands was found for
respondents born in or after 1990. The estimation in column (b), which used a single dummy for respondents born
during this period, conrms this nding. The purpose of the present study is not to evaluate the magnitude of spillover
eects originating from Burkina Faso's political eorts but to explore the marriage-market adjustment taking place in
step with the decline in FGC. Nevertheless, the estimated eect exhibited in column (b) implies that approximately
200 communities ( 3021 communities  0:068) out of about 1,750 communities ( 3021 communities  0:58) that
had practiced FGC before 1990 stopped this practice, assuming that FGC is a normative equilibrium as discussed in
Section 2, and, thus, its prevalence in each community is either one (FGC equilibrium) or zero (no-FGC equilibrium).
In column (c), a dummy for respondents circumcised before reaching age 10 is estimated. In Section 5, the tendency
of girls to undergo FGC at younger ages was reported in both the borderlands and the inlands. If this tendency is
more pronounced in the borderlands, the likelihood of being circumcised at a younger age may increase in these areas
26The DHS team calculated this wealth index using data on a household's ownership of selected assets, such as televisions and bicycles;
materials used for housing construction; and types of water access and sanitation facilities. See http://www.dhsprogram.com/topics/
wealth-index/Wealth-Index-Construction.cfm for more details.
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(even if the overall cutting rate declines in such areas). No evidence supporting this view is shown.
This study also estimated the probability of genital parts being sewn closed with or without a control of an FGC
dummy in columns (d) and (e), respectively. As indicated from the results in these and previous columns, not only
the incidence of FGC but also the incidence of the most radical form of FGC is seen as decreasing over time in the
borderlands. This nding is also notable in terms of a concern pertaining to the accuracy of respondents' self-reported
FGC status. While border respondents might have underreported the incidence of FGC for fear of legal sanctions,
there is no a priori reason why respondents would underreport the types of FGC as well.
Similar estimations were conducted for a dummy denoting whether respondents were circumcised by traditional
cutters in columns (f) and (g). Controlling for FGC in column (g), both statistically and economically, eliminates the
signicant spillover eect revealed in column (f); thus, there is no evidence suggesting that the type of cutters in the
borderlands changed in association with the decline in FGC.
Following Oster (forthcoming), the relative importance of omitted variables that share covariance properties with
observed controls and that are required to explain the identied eects, denoted as  (i.e., a coecient of proportionality
on selection assumptions), was evaluated. By employing the value of R-squared obtained from a hypothetical regression
of the outcome on the treatment, observed, and unobserved controls as Rmax = 1:3R, which is heuristically suggested
in Oster (forthcoming), the corresponding values of  are reported at the bottom of Table 2.27 The reported negative
values indicate that the aforementioned FGC-discouraging eects may be attenuated if any bias exists.
In column (h), this research appended the data drawn from three rounds (1998?99, 2003, 2010) of the Standard
DHS conducted in Burkina Faso to its main study sample and estimated a version of the FGC equation (9), which
additionally includes in regressors the interaction terms between an indicator for the respondents born in or after
1990 and indicators for communities located in Burkina Faso.28 The Burkinabe communities are divided into those
situated within a 30-km distance from its national border and the remaining ones. Two ndings are noted. First,
a signicant decline in FGC is observed in Burkina Faso after this country started to engage in strenuous political
eorts to eradicate FGC (see also Figure S.2 in the supplemental appendix for the trend of the fraction of circumcised
women by three-year cohort of birth). Second, the FGC-discouraging eects are the largest in the inland communities
in Burkina Faso (i.e.,  0:157), followed by those on the borderlands in Burkina Faso (i.e.,  0:137) and, then, those
on the borderlands of its neighboring countries (i.e.,  0:068).
The latter nding is plausible, considering the capital of Burkina Faso, Ouagadougou, is located in the heart of this
country. Namely, this nding may indicate that political eorts are likely to be more inuential in the vicinity of the
27It is assumed that year-of-birth xed eects (t) and communities xed eects (vj) are proportional to unobservables.
28In Burkinabe DHS data, the mean age of FGC is 6.58 years.
19
capital than in the hinterlands (e.g., Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014), and that the policy impacts gradually
decline toward the latter as well as its neighboring countries. On the other hand, the greater impacts on Burkinabe
citizens may also arise from people's incentive to lie about their FGC status for fear of legal punishment. In addition,
the estimated impacts on Burkina Faso capture the inuence of all the economic and political factors generating the
dierence in the trend of FGC between Burkina Faso and (the inlands of) its neighboring countries. The nature of this
country-level dierence in the relevant trends may make the interpretation of the estimates more dicult, particularly
for other outcomes (e.g., marriage, health, education), compared to the analysis of the main study sample, whereby
the borderlands are compared with the inlands within the same country and, thus, under the same economic and
political conditions except for the external policy shock originating from Burkina Faso. These concerns motivate the
present study to focus on Burkina Faso's neighboring countries in all but the exercise performed in this column (h).
For all outcomes analyzed in Table 2, the robustness of ndings was explored in Table 3. First, as Africa's national
borders are often particularly vulnerable to armed conicts and the eects thereof, an attempt was made herein to
control for this inuence. For this purpose, the Uppsala Conict Data Program (UCDP) Georeferenced Event Dataset
(GED) Global version 5.0 (Croicu and Sundberg, 2015; Sundberg and Melander, 2013) was exploited, which contains
information regarding the timing and locations of organized violence from 1989 to 2015 (as of this research) that has
occurred all over the world (see Figure S.1 in the supplemental appendix for the locations of such violence). In the rst
column of Table 3, the number of conict events that occurred within a 40-km radius of each community (interacted
with Dijt) was additionally included as a regressor, and the estimation results are reported.
29 The estimations in the
second column controlled for household xed eects (52,049 groups), whereas community-specic linear time trends,
as measured by the years of birth (a continuous variable) multiplied by dummies for each community, were used
as additional regressors in the analyses of the third column.30 In the fourth column, the sample is dened only by
the recent DHS rounds of the analyzed countries, i.e., Benin 2011?12, Co^te d'Ivoire 2011?12, Mali 2012?13, and
Togo 2013?14. Finally, because respondents might have resided in places far away from their present DHS community
during their childhood, in the fth column, data are utilized pertaining only to those who were identied as permanent
residents of the surveyed community, although only limited rounds of the DHS, i.e., Benin (2001) and Mali (2001,
2006), included this information. The signicant decline in the practice of FGC in the borderlands is again found,
and, overall, the previously stated implications remained unchanged.
One may insist that the FGC-discouraging eects on border respondents are attributed to particular internal polices
29Alternatively, controlling for the number of people who died within a 40-km radius of each community also yielded similar implications.
30When controlling for household xed eects, respondents' ethnicity and religion were excluded from the regressors, because such factors
exhibit only limited intra-household variation. In the estimations in columns (b), (g), (l), and (q) in Table 3, the standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity but not clustered at the community level due to computational complexities.
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\simultaneously" implemented by the neighboring countries themselves, rather than external policy shocks originating
from Burkina Faso. However, the robustness of the ndings to the inclusion of community-specic time trends may
alleviate this (unlikely) concern if the trends appropriately control for such policy eorts. In any case, this concern
does not necessarily invalidate the aim of this research, which is to assess the marriage-market adjustment occurring
in step with the decline in FGC. This purpose can be achieved whether the sources of policy shocks are internal or
external, although the latter shock facilitates causal identication more easily than the former.
[Here, Table 2 and Table 3]
6.2 Marriage
Table 4 reports estimation results for respondents aged 25 years or below regarding the formation of (most likely their
rst) marital union. As seen from columns (a)?(c), there is no evidence suggesting that the likelihoods of getting
married, having sexual intercourse, and giving birth to children by the age of 25 years signicantly changed in the
borderlands along with the decline in cutting rates. However, as column (d) shows, border residents delayed marriage
by 0.7 years.31 While these results are not statistically signicant, both the ages at rst sexual intercourse and rst
birth also increased along with the increasing age at marriage, which might explain the signicant reduction in the
number of children delivered by this age, as revealed in column (g). The \no impact on marriage probability" could
be the total eect of two conicting forces, i.e., the abandonment of FGC decreasing women's marriage prospects
and alternative premarital investment improving such prospects. Accordingly, the estimation in column (h) explored
impacts on education, a likely substitute for FGC in rural settings. However, no educational improvement is found.
Together these ndings may suggest that the external policy shock emanating from Burkina Faso had no inuence on
the probability of young females forming a marital union, although it delayed their entry into marital relationships.
It is not straightforward to interpret the approximately nine-month delay in the rst marriage as possibly causing
the decline in the number of children delivered by the age of 25 years. For example, because an investment in
childbearing may be an important strategy for women to protect them in their old age in rural societies (e.g., Hoddinott,
1992), the reduced fertility may imply their welfare loss. However, the potential trade-o between the quantity
and the quality of children may make the relevant welfare implications ambiguous (e.g., Becker and Lewis, 1973;
Millimet and Wang, 2011). In addition, social scientic and public health research (e.g., Field and Ambrus, 2008;
Marphatia et al., 2017) relates delay in young women's marriage to improvement in numerous welfare outcomes, such
as schooling, maternal health, mortality and morbidity of children born to them, and access to contraception and
31The ages at rst marriage, rst sexual intercourse, and rst birth are estimated only for those who experienced these events.
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health-care services. However, it is not so obvious whether a \signicant" welfare improvement can be achieved when
the mean age at rst marriage solely increases from about 16 years (recall Table 1) to 16.7 years, although the welfare
improvement itself cannot be rejected.32 Moreover, the identied delay in marriage and the reduced fertility might
also have happened just during the unavoidable adjustment periods in social transition.
In Table 5, other marriage-related outcomes were estimated for currently married females aged 25 years or younger.
Because the relevant information pertaining to the analyzed outcomes is not collected in all the DHS rounds, the
exploited sample is reported at the bottom of the table. As the estimation results show, the external policy shock
had no inuence on the probability of young females engaging in polygynous relationships [columns (a)?(b)], their
husband's education [column (c)] and age [column (d)], and family wealth [column (e)].33
If women resisted, did not undergo FGC, and subsequently faced diculty in getting married within their ethnic
group, some may have attempted to nd a marital partner belonging to other ethnic groups. To explore this possibility,
a dummy that takes one if a couple shares the same ethnicity was estimated in column (f). Notably, the sample size in
this estimation is smaller than that in the estimations reported in previous columns, because a husband's ethnicity is
available only for the sub-sample of respondent females.34 The estimation result suggests no impact on the likelihood
of inter-ethnic marriage.
In column (g), a dummy for women's intra-household DM power was estimated. This variable takes the value
one for women who can make an independent decision on items pertaining to own health care, large household
purchases, or visiting their family or relatives. Similarly, a dummy referring to women who suered from emotional,
physical, or sexual violence by their spouses was also estimated in column (h). If any, the likelihood of IPV declined
in the borderlands, although the statistical signicance is marginal. No strong support is provided for the view
that women's welfare decreased in association with the decline in FGC. Estimation results for each item relevant to
women's DM power as well as for each type of IPV are also reported in Table S.4 in the supplemental appendix, but
the aforementioned implications remain largely unchanged.35
The robustness of the ndings reported in Table 4 and Table 5 to conict proximate to a given community,
32To dierentiate child marriage, the committee on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child regards 18 years as the
legal threshold of marriageable age.
33While the results are not reported for brevity, additionally controlling for the number of household members did not aect the
implication regarding the eect on family wealth. This study also estimated a variable, which takes n if a respondent is the nth wife of
her husband, while applying the value of one to all females in monogamous marriage. The implications remained unchanged.
34In the DHS, male household members were also interviewed in some of the selected households. Data on inter-ethnic marriage are only
available when the interviewed man had wives within the interviewed household, who were the female sample of the DHS. On the other
hand, the previously exploited information on husbands' education and age was discerned from the female interviewees. When constructing
the relevant dummy, a couple, in which both members were categorized as \other ethnic group," was assumed to share the same ethnicity.
However, this case corresponds to only approximately 1.7% of the total sample, and excluding this group from the estimation did not aect
the obtained implication.
35Column (c) in Table S.4 shows that women's DM power on the issue of family/relative visiting signicantly declined in the borderlands.
While this nding was robust to controlling for community-specic linear time trends (coecient -0.122 with std. 0.064), statistical
signicance vanishes when household xed eects are controlled for (coecient -0.173 with std. 0.171).
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household xed eects, community-specic linear time trends, and separate sub-samples of the data (recent DHS,
permanent residents) is explored in Table S.5 and Table S.6 in the supplemental appendix. The previous ndings of
an increase in the age at rst marriage (and possibly ages at rst sexual intercourse and rst birth) and the resulting
reduction in fertility are less robust in some specications. Overall, no systematical marriage impacts are observed.
[Here, Table 4 and Table 5]
6.3 Further robustness checks
While the detailed explanation of the estimation results is relegated to Section S.3 in the supplemental appendix,
further robustness checks were performed. First, this study exploited dierent birth year thresholds (1985, 1990, or
1995) and distances to the border (10 km to 200 km) in dening Dijt and Bj (Figure S.3). Second, it estimated
the likelihood of being cut before the age of X (Figure S.4). Third, impacts on FGC and marriage are estimated
separately for each country (Table S.7 and Table S.8). Relying on Murdock (1959)'s classication, fourth, this study
alternatively exploited as Bj an indicator for communities situated in ethnic homelands stretching over Burkina Faso
and its neighboring countries (Table S.9; see also Figure S.5 for such ethnic homelands). Fifth, Table S.10 reports
the estimation results using a sub-sample limited only to the respondents residing within a 60-km distance to Burkina
Faso. Within this sub-sample, the characteristics of the border residents born before 1990 reveal great similarity to
those of the corresponding inland residents due to the geographical proximity, as seen from the summary statistics
of this sub-sample (Table S.11). Sixth, in Table S.12, logit and ordered logit models were also estimated for several
outcomes having the supposed interval (e.g., zero to one for the binary outcomes, one to ve for the wealth index).
Seventh, using data pertaining to females aged 15 to M years, whereby M  49, equation (9) is repeatedly estimated,
and the estimated 2 and its 95% condence intervals are reported in Figure S.6.
Two issues pertaining to statistical inference are also addressed. First, the signicant decline in FGC in the
borderlands might have been revealed by chance in the present study, which explores numerous outcomes. This study
explored whether the nding is robust to the consideration of multiple-hypothesis testing using Bonferroni's, Holm
(1979)'s step-down, and Hochberg (1988)'s step-up adjustment procedures (Table S.13). Second, in Table S.14, it also
exploited standard errors clustered at the levels of administrative units (737 units having approximately four DHS
communities in each unit) and of ethnic homelands based on Murdock (1959)'s classication (78 ethnic homelands).
Overall, the \negative FGC impacts" and \no distinct adverse marriage impacts" of the external policy shock on
young women are conrmed.
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6.4 Selected relocation and health
Despite the highly robust ndings, two important selection issues should still be addressed. First, the possible reduction
of child mortality (or more generally, health improvement) attributed to the abandonment of FGC enables women
currently residing in the borderlands (more precisely, at the time of the most recent rounds of DHS, including the
post-treatment sample) to have certain characteristics valued in marriage markets that systematically dier from
those possessed by inland residents.36 Particularly in the present context, in the borderlands, the possible decrease of
deaths in childhood may increase the intensity of competition in marriage markets among women who survive until
the present and, thus, reduce their current marriage prospects (although this possibility provides further support for
the \no marriage-discouraging eect of the abandonment of FGC"). Second, as respondents might have resided in
locations dierent from their present DHS communities at the time of FGC, the dummy for borderlands can be seen
as a proxy for exposure to Burkina Faso's political inuence measured with some noise, which not only diers between
the border and the inland communities in a systematic manner but also correlates with the outcomes.
On the one hand, such unfavorable health consequences of FGC are not well established in prior studies (see
Wagner, 2015 for the literature review, for example). In fact, it is puzzling why this practice has persisted so long if
it crucially undermines human health, in which case the FGC equilibrium is less likely to arise in the rst instance
(recall the proposition 2 in Section 2).
Regarding the relocation issue, a particular concern in the present context is that respondents born in borderlands
might have left their natal communities at marriage because they refused to undergo FGC and faced diculty in
nding a marital partner in their birthplaces. However, if this is the case, this study would overestimate cutting rates
(i.e., underestimate the decline in FGC) and underestimate marriage probability in the border areas. Given the \no
marriage eect" reported in column (a) of Table 4, there is no a priori reason why female marriage prospects improved
in the border communities. Moreover, if the relocation-induced measurement noise does not systematically dier
between the borderlands and the inlands, this issue simply attenuates the estimates. Consistently, the values of Oster
(forthcoming)'s , as reported in Table 2, indicate that the estimated FGC-discouraging eects may be attenuated
if any bias exists. Moreover, the FGC-discouraging eects on those who were identied as permanent residents of
the surveyed community (and the corresponding values of R-squared) were also greater than those on the full sample
(recall Table 3), although only the limited data, i.e., Benin (2001) and Mali (2001, 2006), severed the relevant analyses.
Nevertheless, an indicator equal to one if the respondents migrated into the present DHS communities (i.e., if they
36The abandonment of FGC may inuence the fertility of the post-treatment sample, as demonstrated in Table 4, and in turn aect
the marital outcomes of children born to this sample. However, the exploited data does not include children born to the post-treatment
sample, thus making the present study free from this concern.
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were not permanent residents), as well as a range of health-related outcomes, such as height, weight, height for age,
body mass index (BMI), hemoglobin levels, indicators for genital problems, and terminated pregnancies, are estimated
for the female respondents aged 25 or below. The results, as reported in Table 6, provide no strong evidence suggesting
the above concerns.37 Notably, the no health impacts exist despite the possibility that women's (apparently marginal)
delay in marriage per se, as found in Table 4, might have improved their health conditions (e.g., anemia, BMI), as
often indicated in public health research (e.g., Marphatia et al., 2017).38
Another similar attempt was also made exploiting the census data drawn from Benin's Population and Habitation
Census (PHC) 1979, 1992, 2002, and 2013 as well as Mali's General Census of Population and Housing (GCPH) 1987,
1998, and 2009. As detailed in Section S.4 in the supplemental appendix, the estimation results show no signicant
impacts on the border residents regarding relocation and morality-related outcomes (Table S.15).
[Here, Table 6]
6.5 FGC as a social norm
Thus far, this study has shown that the external policy shock originating from Burkina Faso's political eorts reduced
the practice of FGC in the borderlands of its neighboring countries while having no distinct negative impacts on young
women's marital outcomes. In this subsection, it discusses how these ndings can be interpreted from a theoretical
standpoint although it hesitates to conclusively advocate a particular interpretation.
As the simple model in Section 2 demonstrated, these ndings are theoretically plausible if and \because" FGC is a
marriage convention as asserted by Mackie (1996), and the costs of FGC (e.g., unfavorable health consequences) were
previously negligible. The no health-undermining impacts of FGC, as explored in subsection 6.4, are also consistent
with this interpretation. In addition, recall that the radical form of FGC is not common in the studied areas.39
Moreover, as shown in subsection S.6.1 in the supplemental appendix, in the exploited DHS data, the fraction of
respondents who believed that FGC would improve women's marriage prospects is small. Since the marriage matching
37In the 2011?12 DHS in Benin, the 2011?12 DHS in Co^te d'Ivoire, and the 2012?13 DHS in Mali, anthropometric information is
available for a 50% sub-sample of the surveyed households. Similarly, the information regarding hemoglobin levels is collected only from a
sub-sample (i.e., 50% or one-third) of the surveyed households, depending upon country and round.
38The no impacts on general health outcomes (e.g., height, weight, BMI, hemoglobin) are consistent with the ndings yielded by Wagner
(2015), which analyzes the DHS data drawn from 13 African countries (including Benin and Mali). On the other hand, she also found that
circumcised women were more likely to suer from vaginal discharge, genital sore/ulcer, and terminated pregnancies than uncircumcised
women. However, she made the relevant comparison of circumcised and uncircumcised women after controlling for the community xed
eects. This implies that the relatively large fraction of communities showing the cutting rate of one or zero, as indeed observed in the
analyzed DHS data (see Figure S.8, as explained in subsection S.6.1 in the supplemental appendix), is not exploited for her identication
of the relevant estimates, which makes the scope of the analyzed population markedly dierent between her and the present studies. She
also found that circumcised women were more likely to marry early and have many children. Because the estimation of the terminated
pregnancies does not control for this increased fertility, the relevant likelihood may articially increase, all the other factors being constant.
Also, it is possible that circumcised and uncircumcised women systematically dier \within" a community, revealing the interior cutting
rate between zero and one.
39Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010) also modeled FGC as a premarital investment. However, the yielded model prediction is not
supported in the empirical analysis conducted herein, as explained in Section S.5 in the supplemental appendix.
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at FGC equilibrium is random with respect to this practice, they might not have identied a discernible marriage
premium from this practice and therefore, might not have answered that FGC improves women's marriageability.
Another interpretation is that FGC is a normative equilibrium but no longer relevant to women's marriage. Young
(2008, 2015) enumerate several mechanisms that, while they may not be mutually exclusive, sustain social norms,
such as a motive to \coordinate" with others in a particular type of transaction (e.g., marriage as claimed in Mackie,
1996), \peer pressure" involving social punishment inicted on deviants and possible screening of conformists (e.g.,
Iannaccone, 1992), and \symbolic signaling" of the holding of particular values or particular group membership.
In this context, Shell-Duncan et al. (2011)'s study conducted in Senegal and The Gambia may provide some
support for this interpretation. According to their conjecture, FGC signals respect for a hierarchical social system
among women, which provides circumcised women with access to network-based social capital in a community. This
social capital may also be maximized by excluding uncircumcised women through peer pressure such as harassment
and ostracism. In Meru, Kenya, Thomas (2000) also links FGC to the maintenance of power wielded by elders among
women of dierent age groups. Similarly, it is also reported that elderly women in Mali advocate FGC to maintain
control over the gendered sphere of power (e.g., Gosselin, 2001).40
The third possibility is that FGC is neither a normative equilibrium nor related to women's marriage. According
to Young (2015), however, social norms have four notable features. First, they show a tendency to \persist" for long
periods. Second, norm shifts tend to be sudden when they take place, which is called \tipping." Third, as norms are
one of the population-level multiple equilibria, they tend to exhibit both \local conformity" and \global diversity."
Fourth, normative behaviors depend less on underlying fundamentals than would otherwise be expected and, therefore,
reveal less diversity, summarized by the term \compression." As already analyzed, the centuries-long practice of FGC
has swiftly declined in the borderlands of Burkina Faso's neighboring countries. This nding supports the rst and
second characteristics. Moreover, taking conceptually similar approaches to those adopted in Bellemare et al. (2015)
and Eerson et al. (2015), in subsection S.6.1 in the supplemental appendix, this study also shows a relatively sharp
discontinuity in cutting rates across communities, while also revealing that approximately 73% of the variation of FGC
is attributed to community-level heterogeneity, which supports the remaining features of social norms. Therefore, this
possibility seems less likely than the rst two interpretations.
40Consistent with these ndings, in Table S.16 as explained in subsection S.6.1 in the supplemental appendix, a relatively large fraction
of the respondents considered that FGC is needed for social acceptance, and this fraction is greater for women than for men. While
the religious requirement is apparently the most agreed-upon benet among the sample respondents, this nding may also suggest the
signicance of religion-based social networks. For example, in Mali, it is reported that uncircumcised Muslim women are not clean and,
therefore, would not be able to pray and fast (Gosselin, 2000a).
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7 Conclusion
This study examined whether and how the abandonment of FGC is associated with women's marital outcomes in the
long term. Two major contributions are noted. First, it claried the long-term relationship between FGC and women's
marriage in a theoretical manner and analyzed this practice's welfare consequences from the mating perspective. For
this purpose, it formalized Mackie (1996)'s theory of marriage convention that has received much publicity in the
elds of anthropology and sociology. Second, it proposed a unique, externally applicable identication strategy and
empirically explored what happens to women's marriage in the long term if they abandon FGC. The empirical analyses
herein exploited a novel setting, whereby the health and political knowledge, whose acquisition was facilitated by
Burkina Faso's political eorts, might have spread to the communities (located close to this country) of its neighboring
countries while increasing the cost of FGC as perceived by the border residents. Then, it was hypothesized that such
knowledge spillovers reduced the practice of FGC in the borderlands.
The DID approach, comparing border and inland communities of the neighboring four countries (i.e., Benin, Co^te
d'Ivoire, Mali, and Togo) before and after Burkina Faso undertook anti-FGC political eorts, provided evidence
consistent with the hypothesis; the practice of FGC swiftly declined in the borderlands. In contrast, this external
policy shock had no inuence on the probability of young females forming a marital union, while having no distinct
adverse impacts on the resulting marital outcomes, as measured by a husband's education and age, the number of
co-wives, family wealth, intra-household DM power, likelihoods of IPV, and so on. It is acknowledged that the marital
outcomes examined herein may not necessarily be optimal measures of married women's welfare, although it is dicult
to estimate such intra-household welfare in general. Nevertheless, women's welfare is less likely to decline signicantly,
concomitantly with the decline in FGC in the long term, at least from the mating perspective in the studied setting.
Despite the careful empirical analysis, however, the implications that are yielded still have to be interpreted
with the following qualication in mind. Namely women's possible health improvement and relocation induced by
the abandonment of FGC might have aected the relevant estimates. However, this concern may not signicantly
undermine the main implications of the present study according to the performed analyses, which show no noticeable
impacts on the health and relocation outcomes in the borderlands. This nding can also be seen as another contribution
of the present paper, because there is little rigorous empirical evidence on the health consequences of FGC. While
future research, particularly the collection and utilization of the long-term panel data tracing the same individuals,
should aim to validate its ndings, to the best of my knowledge, the present study still exploits the most promising
settings (e.g., external policy shock, cross-border knowledge spillover), data (e.g., less noisy FGC measurement), and
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empirical approach (e.g., DID) available to date for the posed question, while shedding light on the issue of FGC, an
area showing a marked paucity of rigorous empirical studies.
The ndings yielded by this study cannot necessarily be generalized to wider spatial and temporal contexts. The
practice of FGC varies across societies and ethnic groups in terms of age of circumcision and the manner of performance
(e.g., Ahmadu, 2000; Gosselin, 2000b). The mechanisms sustaining FGC may also change over time.41 Nevertheless,
the areas and time periods studied in the present research are still larger and longer than those utilized in prior case
studies, and, thus, the reported ndings may attain a certain level of external validity. The high prevalence of FGC
in West Africa also increases the economic signicance of research focusing on this area (e.g., Sipsma et al., 2012).
Finally, the above ndings are not inconsistent with the view that FGC is a marriage convention or at the very
least, a normative equilibrium. Relying on the marriage convention interpretation, it may appear that the present
study opposes (too) costly political eort (only) to eliminate FGC because the welfare improvement arising from the
abandonment of FGC is apparently insignicant. However, inbulation, which may most seriously undermine women's
health, is not common in the studied areas. There are also other welfare outcomes that have not been addressed in
this study (e.g., mental health, mortality and morbidity of children born to mothers refusing FGC, self-esteem, social
capital), particularly if FGC is not a marriage convention. Moreover, this study found a delay in young women's mar-
riage and their reduced fertility in the borderlands in some specications, although its interpretation is not necessarily
straightforward. Thus, it is still important to improve the understanding of the theoretical mechanisms sustaining FGC
while exploring the relevant welfare consequences. This importance holds true because policy interventions pertaining
to FGC have not always resulted in signicantly reducing its prevalence (Berg and Denison, 2012, 2013) and dierent
theoretical mechanisms recommend dierent strategies to put an end to it (Shell-Duncan et al., 2011). Presuming that
FGC is a social norm, identifying the norm-supporting mechanisms (e.g., coordination, peer pressure, and symbolic
signaling) and the corresponding key players (e.g., males, females, elders, and peers) may be a fruitful avenue for
future research. When the elimination of FGC is a policy goal, this future work, possibly involving \community-wide"
randomized controlled trials that have particular target groups and aspects to educate (e.g., health consequences,
human rights), would also improve the eectiveness of the relevant policy interventions.42
41As found for some Malian Mande groups, for instance, the recent declining age at FGC may indicate a loss of the meaning of puberty
rituals previously surrounding this practice (Gosselin, 2000a).
42See also Section S.7 in the supplemental appendix for further policy-oriented discussion.
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Figure 2: Proportion of circumcised population by the year of birth
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Distance to BF  30 km Distance to BF > 30 km All
Mean Std. No. of Mean Std. No. of Mean Std. No. of
obs. obs. obs.
(A) Born before 1990
One if cut 0.71*** 0.45 2818 0.58 0.49 57776 0.58 0.49 60594
One if sewn closed (zero if not cut) 0.06*** 0.25 2400 0.04 0.20 51550 0.04 0.21 53950
One if cut by traditional cutters 0.66*** 0.47 2802 0.51 0.49 57532 0.52 0.49 60334
(zero if not cut)
Age at FGC if cut 6.85 3.91 966 6.83 4.47 15112 6.83 4.44 16078
One if marriedy 0.81*** 0.38 847 0.69 0.46 20310 0.69 0.45 21157
One if ever had sexy 0.87 0.32 844 0.86 0.34 20128 0.86 0.34 20972
One if gave birthy 0.75*** 0.43 847 0.64 0.47 20310 0.65 0.47 21157
Age at rst marriagey 16.05*** 2.53 707 16.49 2.84 14648 16.47 2.83 15355
Age at rst sexy 15.80 2.24 741 15.90 2.38 17412 15.89 2.37 18153
Age at rst birthy 17.16*** 2.52 636 17.64 2.67 13179 17.62 2.66 13815
No. of childreny 1.82*** 1.53 847 1.40 1.40 20310 1.41 1.41 21157
Education (years)y 1.05*** 2.59 845 2.45 3.97 20288 2.39 3.93 21133
One if polygynyz 0.36*** 0.48 693 0.26 0.44 14041 0.26 0.44 14734
No. of a husband's wivesz 1.43*** 0.64 686 1.32 0.60 13886 1.32 0.61 14572
A husband's education (years)z 1.20*** 2.97 668 2.37 4.23 12831 2.31 4.18 13499
A husband's agez 31.96*** 7.99 680 32.86 7.94 13299 32.82 7.95 13979
Family wealth index (1 to 5)z 2.31*** 1.20 442 3.08 1.39 8388 3.04 1.39 8830
One if inter-ethnic marriagez 0.26 0.44 208 0.24 0.43 3518 0.24 0.43 3726
One if have DM powerz 0.21 0.41 685 0.21 0.41 13465 0.21 0.41 14150
One if had any IPVz 0.28 0.45 287 0.27 0.44 4564 0.27 0.44 4851
One if migranty 0.50 0.50 627 0.48 0.49 13054 0.48 0.49 13681
Weight (kg)y 54.25*** 7.32 756 55.84 9.65 18029 55.77 9.57 18965
Height (cm)y 159.74 6.74 753 159.70 7.04 18263 159.70 7.02 19016
Height for age (z-scores)y -0.60 1.01 751 -0.61 1.06 18134 -0.61 1.06 18885
BMI  10y 212.52*** 27.51 753 218.47 33.70 18156 218.23 33.49 18909
Hemoglobin (g/dl)y 11.46 1.68 304 11.34 1.84 6934 11.35 1.83 7238
One if had genital sore/ulcery 0.07 0.25 814 0.07 0.25 16972 0.07 0.25 17786
One if had genital dischargey 0.13** 0.34 817 0.16 0.36 16983 0.15 0.36 17800
One if had terminated pregnancyy 0.09 0.28 834 0.08 0.28 18753 0.08 0.28 19587
Birth order 3.34 2.10 3006 3.33 1.81 65125 3.33 1.82 68131
One if Muslim 0.55*** 0.49 3004 0.59 0.49 65030 0.59 0.49 68034
One if Christian 0.19*** 0.39 3004 0.27 0.44 65030 0.27 0.44 68034
Urban (dummy) 0.11*** 0.32 3006 0.38 0.48 65125 0.36 0.48 68131
No. of battles ( 10) 0.09*** 0.28 3006 0.83 2.33 65125 0.80 2.28 68131
Continued
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Table 1: Continued
Distance to BF  30 km Distance to BF > 30 km All
Mean Std. No. of Mean Std. No. of Mean Std. No. of
obs. obs. obs.
(B) Born in or after 1990
One if cut 0.40 0.49 554 0.43 0.49 11118 0.43 0.49 11672
One if sewn closed (zero if not cut) 0.04 0.19 494 0.04 0.21 10048 0.04 0.21 10542
One if cut by traditional cutters 0.36 0.48 554 0.38 0.48 11083 0.38 0.48 11637
(zero if not cut)
Age at FGC if cut 5.62 3.47 85 5.96 4.14 1726 5.94 4.11 1811
One if marriedy 0.45*** 0.49 644 0.35 0.47 13990 0.35 0.47 14634
One if ever had sexy 0.61 0.48 642 0.64 0.47 13864 0.64 0.47 14506
One if gave birthy 0.37** 0.48 644 0.33 0.47 13990 0.33 0.47 14634
Age at rst marriagey 16.22 2.30 299 16.00 2.40 5156 16.01 2.39 5455
Age at rst sexy 15.81 1.99 395 15.68 2.05 8883 15.69 2.04 9278
Age at rst birthy 17.11 2.32 242 16.95 2.21 4677 16.95 2.21 4919
No. of childreny 0.56* 0.87 644 0.50 0.83 13990 0.50 0.83 14634
Education (years)y 2.84*** 3.61 642 4.51 4.39 13980 4.44 4.38 14622
One if polygynyz 0.28*** 0.45 295 0.20 0.40 4958 0.21 0.40 5253
No. of a husband's wivesz 1.32** 0.55 294 1.24 0.52 4903 1.25 0.52 5197
A husband's education (years)z 2.48*** 3.93 293 3.21 4.60 4836 3.17 4.57 5129
A husband's ageyz 28.77*** 6.80 295 29.89 8.56 4897 29.82 8.48 5192
Family wealth index (1 to 5)z 2.20*** 1.27 295 2.83 1.38 4958 2.79 1.38 5253
One if inter-ethnic marriagez 0.11*** 0.32 109 0.24 0.42 1499 0.23 0.42 1608
One if have DM powerz 0.14* 0.35 295 0.18 0.38 4952 0.17 0.38 5247
One if had any IPVz 0.33 0.47 142 0.33 0.47 2161 0.33 0.47 2303
One if migranty 0.18 0.39 64 0.24 0.42 1163 0.23 0.42 1227
Weight (kg)y 51.90*** 8.14 402 54.14 9.88 9572 54.05 9.83 9974
Height (cm)y 158.07 7.38 402 158.06 7.95 9536 158.06 7.93 9938
Height for age (z-scores)y -0.76 0.90 400 -0.77 1.08 9461 -0.77 1.07 9861
BMI  10y 206.45*** 28.25 401 215.92 34.29 9504 215.54 34.11 9905
Hemoglobin (g/dl)y 11.76 1.74 318 11.75 1.66 5894 11.75 1.66 6212
One if had genital sore/ulcery 0.03* 0.18 638 0.04 0.21 13913 0.04 0.21 14551
One if had genital dischargey 0.10 0.30 638 0.11 0.31 13907 0.11 0.31 14545
One if had terminated pregnancyy 0.03 0.17 644 0.03 0.19 13981 0.03 0.19 14625
Birth order 3.54 2.06 644 3.46 1.96 13990 3.46 1.96 14634
One if Muslim 0.44 0.49 644 0.47 0.49 13978 0.47 0.49 14622
One if Christian 0.35** 0.47 644 0.39 0.48 13978 0.39 0.48 14622
Urban (dummy) 0.16*** 0.36 644 0.45 0.49 13990 0.43 0.49 14634
No. of battles ( 10) 0.21*** 0.43 644 1.02 2.42 13990 0.98 2.38 14634
Notes: (1) The equality of means between the respondents residing within a 30-km distance to Burkina Faso and the remaining respondents
are examined by T-tests. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) The information is relevant only to the respondents
aged 25 or below for y, married respondents aged 25 or below for z, and all the respondents aged 49 or below for the remaining.
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Table 2: Impacts on FGC (OLS)
Dependent variables: One if One if One if One if One if One if One if One if
cut cut cut by sewn sewn traditional traditional cut
age 10 closed closed cutters cutters
(zero if (zero if (zero if (zero if (Append
not cut) not cut) not cut) not cut) BF's DHS)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Located within a 30-km distance to BF
 Born in or after 1995 -0.125*** - - - - - - -
(0.041)
 Born b/w 1990 and 1994 -0.069** - - - - - - -
(0.032)
 Born b/w 1985 and 1989 -0.033 - - - - - - -
(0.026)
 Born b/w 1980 and 1984 -0.015 - - - - - - -
(0.022)
 Born b/w 1975 and 1979 -0.018 - - - - - - -
(0.024)
 Born b/w 1970 and 1974 -0.019 - - - - - - -
(0.024)
 Born b/w 1965 and 1969 -0.018 - - - - - - -
(0.021)
 Born in or after 1990 - -0.068*** -0.048** -0.062*** -0.055*** -0.052* 0.005 -0.068***
(0.026) (0.021) (0.019) (0.017) (0.027) (0.011) (0.026)
Located in BF's borderlands ( 30 km)
 Born in or after 1990 - - - - - - - -0.137***
(0.022)
Located in BF's inlands (> 30 km)
 Born in or after 1990 - - - - - - - -0.157***
(0.011)
Birth order 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.000 -0.000 0.002*** -0.000 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Muslim 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.115*** 0.019*** 0.006 0.101*** -0.002 0.083***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007)
Christian -0.049*** -0.049*** -0.046*** -0.002 0.002 -0.037*** 0.004 -0.049***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005)
One if cut - - - - 0.109*** - 0.857*** -
(0.007) (0.007)
Oster (forthcoming)'s  - -3.638 -0.617 -4.262 -4.640 -17.203 -0.155 -
Predicted values within the 0.997 0.008 1.000 0.725 0.752 0.997 0.813 0.983
unit interval (proportion)
R-squared 0.761 0.761 0.699 0.291 0.307 0.648 0.819 0.663
No. of obs. 71921 71921 71921 64188 64188 71627 71627 105366
Country-ethnicity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-of-birth FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Community FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-of-interview FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each community.
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Table 3: Robustness checks on impacts on FGC (OLS)
Battle Household Time Recent Permanent
FE trend DHS residents
Dependent variable: One if cut
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e)
Born in or after 1990
 Located within a 30-km -0.070*** -0.074** -0.053** -0.059** -0.159***
distance to BF (0.026) (0.031) (0.023) (0.029) (0.056)
 No. of battles ( 10) -0.003* - - - -
within 40 km (0.002)
R-squared 0.761 0.931 0.781 0.702 0.819
No. of obs. 71921 72266 71921 37576 15613
Dependent variable: One if cut by age 10
(f) (g) (h) (i) (j)
Born in or after 1990
 Located within a 30-km -0.051** -0.057* -0.042* -0.038* -0.137*
distance to BF (0.021) (0.031) (0.025) (0.022) (0.071)
 No. of battles ( 10) -0.003* - - - -
within 40 km (0.002)
R-squared 0.699 0.892 0.718 0.668 0.708
No. of obs. 71921 72266 71921 37576 15613
Dependent variable: One if sewn closed (zero if not cut)
(k) (l) (m) (n) (o)
Born in or after 1990
 Located within a 30-km -0.055*** -0.069*** -0.014 -0.057*** -0.013
distance to BF (0.017) (0.023) (0.015) (0.019) (0.023)
 No. of battles ( 10) -0.000 - - - -
within 40 km (0.001)
One if cut 0.109*** 0.078*** 0.108*** 0.138*** 0.095***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.013)
R-squared 0.307 0.853 0.344 0.314 0.382
No. of obs. 64188 64492 64188 34669 13001
Dependent variable: One if cut by traditional cutters (zero if not cut)
(p) (q) (r) (s) (t)
Born in or after 1990
 Located within a 30-km 0.005 0.016 0.006 0.012 -0.022
distance to BF (0.011) (0.016) (0.017) (0.011) (0.033)
 No. of battles ( 10) 0.000 - - - -
within 40 km (0.001)
One if cut 0.857*** 0.847*** 0.858*** 0.914*** 0.859***
(0.007) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.013)
R-squared 0.819 0.933 0.827 0.872 0.756
No. of obs. 71627 71971 71627 37463 15533
Birth order YES YES YES YES YES
Religion YES NO YES YES YES
Country-ethnicity FE YES NO YES YES YES
Year-of-birth FE YES YES YES YES YES
Community FE YES NO YES YES YES
Year-of-interview FE YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity in columns (b), (g), (l), and (q), whereas they are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each
community in the remaining columns.
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Table 4: Marriage eects on females aged 25 or below (OLS)
Dependent variables: One if One if One if Age at Age at Age at No. of Education
married ever ever rst rst rst children (years)
had gave marriage sex birth
sex birth
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Located within a 30-km distance to BF
 Born in or after 1990 0.010 -0.006 -0.013 0.733** 0.205 0.420 -0.368*** -0.409
(0.040) (0.033) (0.028) (0.285) (0.214) (0.258) (0.081) (0.266)
Birth order -0.001 0.001 0.002* -0.024** -0.013* -0.022** 0.005* -0.018*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.010) (0.007) (0.010) (0.003) (0.011)
Muslim 0.028** -0.003 -0.004 0.131 0.144** 0.109 -0.036 0.145
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.094) (0.065) (0.091) (0.025) (0.094)
Christian -0.058*** -0.014* -0.058*** 0.472*** 0.242*** 0.326*** -0.179*** 1.600***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.094) (0.058) (0.087) (0.023) (0.084)
Predicted values within the 0.783 0.697 0.666 - - - - -
unit interval (proportion)
R-squared 0.492 0.412 0.467 0.351 0.293 0.334 0.528 0.448
No. of obs. 35645 35332 35645 20706 27305 18651 35645 35609
Country-ethnicity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-of-birth FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Community FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-of-interview FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each community.
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Table 5: Marriage eects on married females aged 25 or below (OLS)
Dependent variables: One if Total A husband's Wealth One One One
polygyny no. of education age index if inter- if have if had
a husband's (years) (years) (1 to 5) ethnic DM any
wives marriage power IPV
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Located within a 30-km distance to BF
 Born in or after 1990 0.019 0.025 0.116 -0.598 -0.076 0.037 -0.049 -0.136*
(0.051) (0.064) (0.343) (0.787) (0.083) (0.058) (0.034) (0.076)
Birth order 0.004** 0.007*** -0.004 0.062* 0.004 0.002 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.016) (0.033) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003)
Muslim -0.001 -0.022 -0.089 -0.142 0.196*** 0.040 -0.019 -0.092***
(0.018) (0.026) (0.138) (0.350) (0.044) (0.039) (0.017) (0.030)
Christian -0.087*** -0.141*** 1.391*** -1.371*** 0.178*** 0.043 0.025* -0.065**
(0.017) (0.030) (0.150) (0.312) (0.036) (0.032) (0.014) (0.031)
Predicted values within 0.960 - - - 1.000 0.894 0.977 0.996
the unit/index
interval (proportion)
R-squared 0.242 0.256 0.468 0.298 0.734 0.602 0.274 0.343
No. of obs. 19886 19669 18530 19072 14038 5304 19297 7117
Country-ethnicity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-of-birth FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Community FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-of-interview FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample DHS
Benin 2001 YES YES YES YES NO YES YES NO
Benin 2011-12 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES NO
Co^te d'Ivoire 1998-99 YES YES NO NO NO NO NO NO
Co^te d'Ivoire 2011-12 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mali 2001 YES YES YES YES NO YES YES NO
Mali 2006 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mali 2012-13 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Togo 2013-14 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each community.
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Table 6: Selected relocation and health: Females aged 25 or below (OLS)
Dependent variables: One if Weight Height Height BMI Hemoglobin One if One if One if
migrant (kg) (cm) for ( 10) (g/dl) had had had ever
age genital genital terminated
(z-scores) sore/ulcer discharge pregnancy
in the in the
last 12 last 12
months months
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
Located within a 30-km distance to BF
 Born in or after 1990 -0.103 1.053 0.688 0.046 0.387 0.093 0.005 0.013 0.034*
(0.073) (0.855) (0.763) (0.095) (3.872) (0.219) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019)
Birth order -0.001 0.058* 0.029 0.007* 0.162 0.007 0.001 0.000 0.002*
(0.002) (0.033) (0.026) (0.004) (0.115) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Muslim 0.034 1.330*** 0.941*** 0.124*** 2.861*** -0.109 -0.015* -0.003 -0.017**
(0.023) (0.270) (0.235) (0.031) (0.936) (0.083) (0.008) (0.010) (0.007)
Christian 0.012 0.796*** 0.628*** 0.082*** 1.243 -0.041 -0.008 -0.004 -0.006
(0.023) (0.249) (0.212) (0.028) (0.898) (0.072) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)
R-squared 0.229 0.233 0.243 0.220 0.236 0.331 0.146 0.181 0.130
No. of obs. 14787 28812 28826 28620 28688 13397 32194 32203 34066
Country-ethnicity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-of-birth FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Community FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-of-interview FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample DHS
Benin 2001 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Benin 2011-12 NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Co^te d'Ivoire 1998-99 NO YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO
Co^te d'Ivoire 2011-12 NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mali 2001 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mali 2006 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mali 2012-13 NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Togo 2013-14 NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each community.
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Supplemental appendix
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S.1 Proof
Proof of proposition 1:
Note that men choose g0 = 0 to encourage uncircumcised women to accept a marital oer, resulting in vm(g0; k0;m)
= (1   )b and vw(g0; k0;m) = 0. Since (1   )b  0, men always have an (weak) incentive to make a marital oer
to uncircumcised women rather than staying single. To consider an equilibrium where women choose FGC while
accepting a marital oer, it must be the case that gc  c0  0 as well as p(gc  c0) + (1  p)( c0)  pg0+ (1  p)  0 =
0, resulting in gc  c0p  ~c0. So, men choose gc = ~c0, resulting vm(gc; kc;m) = b  ~c0 and vw(gc; kc;m) = ~c0  c0 > 0.
Now, consider the following three cases. First, assume the equilibrium fraction of the circumcised girls in a
community  =   ~c0b . Since b  ~c0  0 and (1  )b > 0 in this case, men prefer to marry uncircumcised women
and uncircumcised women accept the proposal. For this outcome to be realized at equilibrium, women have to choose
k = k0, which leads to  = 0 <
~c0
b (no-FGC equilibrium). Second, assume 
 =  > b+~c02b . Since  >
b+~c0
2b >
~c0
b , it
becomes that b  ~c0 > 0 and b  ~c0 > (1  )b. Therefore, men prefer to marry circumcised women and circumcised
women accept the proposal. For this outcome to be realized at equilibrium, women have to choose k = kc, which leads
to  = 1 > b+~c02b (FGC equilibrium). Third, assume
~c0
b < 
 = ^  b+~c02b . In this case, it becomes that (1   ^)b 
^b  ~c0 > 0. When (1  ^)b > ^b  ~c0, men prefer to marry uncircumcised women and uncircumcised women accept
the proposal. For this outcome to be realized at equilibrium, women have to choose k = k0, which leads to ^ = 0 
~c0
b . This is a contradiction to the denition of ^. When (1  ^)b = ^b  ~c0 (i.e., ^ = b+~c02b ), men are indierent to the
practice of FGC. In this case, it is possible that women randomize the cutting decision at equilibrium and choose k
= kc with the probability
b+~c0
2b and k = k0 with the remaining probability.
43 However, this equilibrium is not stable
because just a small deviation from this fraction leads to either the FGC or no-FGC equilibrium.
Proof of proposition 2:
As before, men choose gc = ~c1 (or g0 = 0) to encourage circumcised (or uncircumcised) women to accept a marital
oer. Assume the equilibrium fraction  = ~  1 < b+~c12b < ~c1b . Since ~b  ~c1 < 0 and ~b  ~c1 < (1  ~)b, men prefer
to marry uncircumcised women and uncircumcised women accept the proposal. For this outcome to be realized at
equilibrium, women have to choose k = k0, which leads to ~ = 0  1.
43Put dierently, for women to randomize the cutting decision, it must be the case that p(gc   c0) + (1  p)( c0) = pg0 + (1  p)  0, so
gc  g0 = ~c0. For men to be indierent to the practice of FGC, which allows women to randomize the cutting decision, it must be the case
that b gc = (1 )b g0, so  = b+gc g02b . Therefore, it must be the case that  = b+~c02b at the interior equilibrium. To encourage women
to accept a marital oer in this equilibrium, men have to choose gc (when proposing to circumcised women) and g0 (when proposing to
uncircumcised women), such that gc   g0 = ~c0, gc   c0  0, and g0  0. Consequently, men choose gc = ~c0 and g0 = 0.
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S.2 Parallel-trend assumption
This section statistically tests whether trends in cutting rates before 1990 are parallel between the border and the
inland communities. Data pertaining to respondents born in or before 1989 are used to estimate the following equation:
yijt = 1 +
X
h
h2 Whij +
X
h
h3 Whij Bj + vj + uijt; (S.2.1)
where Whij is a dummy equal to one if the person was born in year h and zero otherwise (the reference group
included those born in or before 1979), and uijt is a stochastic error term. With [column (b)] or without [column
(a)] several individual-level controls, estimation results for cutting rates are reported in Table S.1. The estimated h3
are insignicantly dierent from zero, both individually and jointly (see p-values at the bottom of the table). This
exercise provided no evidence undermining the parallel-trend assumption of cutting rates before 1990.
S.3 Further robustness checks
S.3.1 Alternative threshold years and distances to Burkina Faso
By exploiting dierent birth year thresholds (1985, 1990, or 1995) and distances to the border (10 km to 200 km)
in dening Dijt and Bj , the top-left panel in Figure S.3 reports the estimated impacts on an indicator for FGC.
Estimates corresponding to dierent birth year thresholds are also reported in the remaining panels along with 95%
condence intervals. First, given the xed birth year threshold, external inuences of Burkina Faso's political eorts
are greater when the treated communities are dened as those located closer to this country. Second, given the xed
threshold of distances to Burkina Faso, the relevant spillover eects are greater when the treated cohorts are dened
as respondents born more recently, as observable in the top-left panel.
S.3.2 Girls' tendency to undergo FGC at younger ages
Similar to the estimation result shown in column (c) in Table 2, Figure S.4 indicates the 2 and the corresponding
95% condence intervals arising from estimations of the likelihood of being cut before the age of X years. The large
decline in estimates from the age of four to ve years in this gure is due to the age at FGC being assumed to be
ve years when respondents referred to \during infancy" as the timing of circumcision. Overall, there is no evidence
suggesting that girls undergo this procedure at younger ages in the borderlands compared to the inlands. Rather, the
results conrm the overall decline in cutting rates in the border areas, as shown in columns (a) and (b) of Table 2.
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S.3.3 Country-by-country regressions
In Table S.7, impacts on FGC are shown separately for each country. While the statistical signicance is not always
strong, as seen from panel (A), the aforementioned negative eects on cutting rate and inbulation are observed in
all countries. The relevant statistical signicance was more pronounced when exploiting dierent thresholds of birth
years (i.e., 1995) and of distances to the border (i.e., 40 km) in dening Dijt and Bj [panel (B)]. In addition, the
estimation results in Mali are noteworthy, because this country has not legally prohibited the practice of FGC, and,
thus, information on FGC is more reliable (see also 28 TOO MANY, 2014 for the country prole on this practice).44
See also Table S.8 for the corresponding estimation results of marital outcomes.
S.3.4 An alternative treatment indicator by Murdock (1959)'s ethnic homelands
Relying on Murdock (1959)'s classication, this study alternatively exploited as Bj an indicator for communities
situated in ethnic homelands stretching over Burkina Faso and its neighboring countries and estimated equation (9)
with the same controls exploited before.4546 Out of 78 ethnic homelands mapped on the analyzed four countries,
18 ethnic homelands (one located over Benin and Togo, one over Co^te d'Ivoire and Mali, one in Benin, six in Co^te
d'Ivoire, six in Mali, and three in Togo), were identied as crossing the national border to Burkina Faso (see also
Figure S.5). With coecients on controls suppressed, the estimated treatment eects are reported in Table S.9. A
signicant decline in cutting rates was found in those 18 ethnic homelands, although the impact on the sewn-closed
form of FGC is not robust in this specication.
S.3.5 Balance: A sub-sample of geographical proximity
Table S.10 reports the estimation results using a sub-sample limited only to the respondents residing within a 60-km
distance to Burkina Faso. Within this sub-sample, the characteristics of the border residents born before 1990 reveal
great similarity to those of the corresponding inland residents due to the geographical proximity, as seen from the
summary statistics of this sub-sample (see Table S.11). While only a few variables indicate statistically signicant
dierences between the inlands and the borderlands, some of them (e.g., religion, community-level characteristics) are
controlled in regressions. As Table S.10 shows, the results again reveal a signicant decline in FGC in the borderlands.
44Nevertheless, it is still possible that Malian people would not honestly represent FGC status if they believed that Burkina Faso's legal
penalty applied to them or that Mali also had a similar law. However, if this is the case, in the absence of arrests in Mali, these beliefs
could be transient, and therefore the decline of FGC should not be observed in the long term.
45A map of Murdock (1959)'s ethnic homelands is available from https://scholar.harvard.edu/nunn/pages/data-0 due to a contribu-
tion made by Nunn (2008).
46Fixed eects corresponding to the ethnic homelands were not controlled because the exploited regressors include the community xed
eects.
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S.3.6 Non-linear models
OLS can yield predicted values outside the supposed interval (e.g., zero to one for the binary outcomes, one to ve
for the wealth index). However, a proportion of the predicted values within the supposed interval, reported at the
bottom of Table 2, Table 4, and Table 5, is not necessarily small. In the estimated impacts of the incidence of FGC,
for example, the proportion is almost one.
Nevertheless, it is still possible to estimate nonlinear models such as a conditional logit model (Chamberlain, 1980)
or a xed-eects ordered logit model (Baetschmann et al., 2015) while avoiding the potential incidental parameter
problem that arises from exploiting numerous community-level indicators in the nonlinear models (e.g., Greene, 2004;
Lancaster, 2000). However, estimating a large battery of xed eects in these models is very demanding in general
and may not be appropriate when the xed eects tend to explain the outcomes perfectly.47
Therefore, after replacing community and year-of-birth xed eects with dummies for respondents residing within
a 30-km distance to Burkina Faso and for those born in or after 1990 (while keeping the remaining regressors exploited
previously), logit and ordered logit models were estimated in Table S.12. This table reports the (proportional) odds
ratio of interest, i.e., how much the impacts of Burkina Faso's policy shock on the expected odds, as normalized by
the baseline odds of their own categories (i.e., border or inland residents), dier between the border and the inland
communities in a proportional sense (see also Buis, 2010 for the interpretation). A ratio less than one indicates that
the negative (positive) impacts of the policy shock for the border residents are greater (smaller) than for the inland
residents in a multiplicative sense. The reported estimates may be biased because these estimations do not control for
all time-invariant characteristics specic to each community. Nevertheless, overall, the resultant implications remained
unchanged.
S.3.7 Data pertaining to females aged 15 to M years (M  49)
Exploiting dierent samples, equation (9) is repeatedly estimated, and the estimated 2 and its 95% condence
intervals are reported in Figure S.6. In this gure, the estimate corresponding to age M in the horizontal axis results
from the regression using data pertaining to females aged 15 to M years.48 The \negative FGC impacts" and \no
distinct adverse marriage impacts" of the external policy shock are conrmed.
However, three new ndings are noteworthy. First, exploiting the elder cohort in the estimated sample resulted
47For example, if all respondents in a community practice or do not practice FGC, all respondents in this community are computationally
excluded from the estimated sample of the FGC equation when controlling for community xed eects. Thus, a (quasi-)discontinuity in
cutting rates across the surveyed communities, as shown in Figure S.8 (see subsection S.6.1 for its explanation), renders the conditional
logit model less suitable for the analysis of FGC.
48Estimation results using data on females aged 18 or below are also available upon request, although they should be interpreted with
caution due to the reduced sample size, as evidenced by the inated standard errors.
48
in identifying signicantly positive impacts of the external shock on the probability of being married. However, this
nding is not robust. The estimated marriage eects exploiting the full sample (i.e., females aged 15 to 49 years)
considerably decreased, and statistical signicance was lost once the estimations controlled for household xed eects
(coecient 0.044 with std. 0.056)49 or linear time trends specic to each community (coecient 0.023 with std. 0.034),
compared to the estimate (coecient 0.087 with std. 0.030) reported in Figure S.6.50
Second, Burkina Faso's political eorts signicantly reduced the likelihood of IPV that hurt married women aged
15 to 49 years in the borderlands (coecient -0.150 with std. 0.049). Again, the coecient declined to -0.072 (standard
error of 0.064) when the estimation controlled for community-specic linear time trends.51 In any case, there is no
indication that women's welfare decreased in the borderlands in terms of IPV.
Third, husbands' age signicantly declined among the currently married women aged 15 to 49 years in the bor-
derlands, as evidenced by the coecient of -1.600 (standard error of 0.608). This nding seems tenable, because
controlling for household xed eects (coecient -1.319 with std. 3.606) or community-specic linear time trends
(coecient -1.530 with std. 0.695) had little impact on the magnitude. During the period that allowed society to
shift from an old to a new equilibrium, senior men may not have desired to get married to women who abandoned
FGC, and, therefore, young women who did not undergo FGC might have ended by marrying young men. That said,
statistical signicance is absent in the specication including the household xed eects.
S.3.8 Inference: Multiple-hypothesis testing and alternative levels of clustering
Two issues pertaining to statistical inference are addressed. First, the signicant decline in FGC in the borderlands
might have been revealed by chance in the present study, which explores numerous outcomes. To address this concern,
this study explores whether the nding is robust to the consideration of multiple-hypothesis testing. After selecting the
14 key outcomes to avoid the relevant tests being too conservative (e.g., Schochet, 2008), the present study replicates
estimates from Table 2, Table 4, and Table 5 and reports the original p-values, along with the adjusted p-values using
Bonferroni's, Holm (1979)'s step-down, and Hochberg (1988)'s step-up adjustment procedures, as shown in Table
S.13.52 These tests tend to suer from low statistical power because they do not account for dependency across tests
when controlling the familywise error rate. Nevertheless, the negative FGC eect (with statistical signicance around
49The standard errors in the specication of household xed eects are only robust to heteroskedasticity because of computational
constraints to clustering residuals within a community.
50In addition, as the likelihood of marital dissolution and/or widowhood increases with age, the full-sample estimates include impacts
not only on forming but also on preserving a marital union. Providing a meaningful interpretation for the impacts on remaining in marital
relationships goes somewhat beyond the scope of the present paper.
51Estimation results controlling for household xed eects were not available due to computational diculties.
52As early marriage, early sexual intercourse, and early childbirth are highly correlated, the exercises in Table S.13 focused on the impacts
on marriage, which is one of the two most important outcomes in the present study (i.e., FGC and marriage).
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5% to 10% levels), the increase in the age at rst marriage (at around 10%), and fertility reduction (at 1%) were still
detected.
Second, in the present study, it may be plausible to cluster standard errors at the level of marriage markets. While
it is dicult to discern the relevant market boundaries, the aforementioned 14 outcomes are re-estimated in Table
S.14, along with the standard errors clustered at the levels of administrative units [columns (d)?(f)], as described in
subsection S.6.1, and of ethnic homelands based on Murdock (1959)'s classication [columns (g)?(i)], as described in
subsection S.3.4. The obtained implications remain unchanged.
S.4 Selected relocation and health: Census data
Similar analyses to those performed in Table 6 were also made exploiting the census data. The data drawn from
Benin's Population and Habitation Census (PHC) 1979, 1992, 2002, and 2013 as well as Mali's General Census of
Population and Housing (GCPH) 1987, 1998, and 2009 made this attempt possible. These data, which refer to 10% of
the total population, are available from the \Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), International: Version
7.0" (Minnesota Population Center, 2018).53 After 16 second-level administrative units (out of all the analyzed 124
units) whose centroids are located within a 30-km distance to the national border to Burkina Faso, for females aged 15
to 25 years old, migration and mortality-related outcomes are examined in columns (a)?(c) in Table S.15. A map of
the administrative units is also sourced from the IPUMS project (see Figure S.7).54 Because the performed analyses
did not control several covariates (e.g., ethnicity, religion), which are not available in all the census rounds, these
factors might also have aected the estimates. Nevertheless, the results show no signicant impacts on the border
residents regarding the relocation and health-related outcomes.5556
Women's marriage-related outcomes are also estimated in the remaining columns. The estimation results in columns
(d)?(e) show a signicant decline in the likelihoods of getting married and giving birth to children by the age of 25
years. Apparently, these results may not support the main ndings relying on the DHS data. However, these results
may also indicate an increase in ages at rst marriage and rst birth. Together with a signicant decline in fertility
and no impacts on education, as found in column (f) and columns (g)?(h), respectively, all these results are still not
53See https://international.ipums.org/international-action/sample details/country/bj#bj1979a, https://international.
ipums.org/international-action/sample details/country/bj#bj1992a, https://international.ipums.org/international-action/
sample details/country/bj#bj2002a, and https://international.ipums.org/international-action/sample details/country/bj#
bj2013a for the details of the PHC 1979, 1992, 2002, and 2013, respectively. See also https://international.ipums.org/
international-action/sample details/country/ml#ml1987a, https://international.ipums.org/international-action/sample
details/country/ml#ml1998a, and ttps://international.ipums.org/international-action/sample details/country/ml#ml2009a for
details of the GCPH 1987, 1998, and 2009, respectively.
54See https://international.ipums.org/international/gis.shtml.
55The respondents were dened as migrants if their previous residence is a dierent major administrative unit or abroad.
56The IPUMS project provided no census data for Co^te d'Ivoire and Togo at the time of the present study (see https://international.
ipums.org/international-action/samples).
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inconsistent with the main ndings of the present study.
S.5 Literature review: FGC as a premarital investment
Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010) modeled FGC as a premarital investment and showed that ineciently high
(but not 100%) cutting rates in a community (i.e., FGC equilibrium according to their denition) arise as a mixed
strategy equilibrium, along with males and females matched assortatively on the basis of FGC and grooms' wealth
\within" a community achieving the FGC equilibrium.57
Their model diers from Mackie (1996) by assuming that two (publicly known) types of men in a marriage market
(i.e., rich and poor), both of whom \innately" prefer to marry circumcised women rather than uncircumcised women,
and that women also prefer to marry rich men relative to poor men. The marriage market, having the same number
of men and women, includes two rounds, with the rst round characterized as random matching and the second round
of \assumed" positive assortative matching based on FGC and men's wealth.
Due to these assumptions, all men in the FGC equilibrium decline to marry uncircumcised women in the rst round
because they have a positive probability of being matched with circumcised women in the second round. On the other
hand, men have no such incentive in a community that has a zero cutting rate (i.e., no-FGC equilibrium). Because
this implies that all rich men (as well as poor men) in the no-FGC equilibrium marry in the rst round, women in
this equilibrium have no chance to meet rich men in the second round. Therefore, (whether matched with rich men or
poor men) women in the no-FGC equilibrium would not decline their marriage in the rst round. Consequently, an
equilibrium shift from an FGC to a no-FGC equilibrium would decrease women's age at marriage in the long term.58
While their theory is salient for considering dierences in age at marriage and a husband's wealth between circumcised
and uncircumcised women \within" a community achieving the FGC equilibrium according to their denition, this
prediction is not supported in the empirical analysis conducted in the present study. On the other hand, according
to their model, women's marriage probability and marital outcomes as measured by a husband's wealth would not be
aected by the equilibrium shift, on average.
57In general, assortative matching based on a premarital investment can arise in marriage markets characterized by heterogeneous men
and women, which potentially improves economic eciency (e.g., Bidner, 2010; Hoppe et al., 2009; Rege, 2008). However, premarital
investments are inherently public goods in the sense that the return may not be fully enjoyed by parents. Therefore, parents may
underinvest in children (i.e., holdup problem). Alternatively, as a small advantage over others may result in a match with a partner of
a considerably high quality, this rat-race nature of marriage markets may stimulate parents to overinvest in their children. These factors
may reduce social welfare arising from assortative and ecient matching (e.g., Bhaskar and Hopkins, 2016; Peters, 2007; Peters and Siow,
2002). In Chesnokova and Vaithianathan (2010), women enjoy high returns by marrying rich men, and the rat-race nature of marriage
markets induces ineciently high levels of FGC, whereas the value of marriage-related customs (e.g., FGC) to men plays a role in driving
market ineciency in the model presented in Section 2.
58However, note that because men prefer to marry circumcised rather than uncircumcised women, FGC is correlated with younger age
at marriage \within" a community achieving the FGC equilibrium.
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S.6 Further data overview: FGC as a marriage convention
Mackie (1996) claims that (1) FGC is a social norm, namely one of the group-level multiple equilibria, and (2) FCG
is particularly supported by women's motive to coordinate a marital transaction. This section presents several data
characteristics from these perspectives.
S.6.1 Is it a social norm?
Four notable features of \social norms" are summarized in Young (2015). First, social norms show a tendency to
\persist" for long periods. Second, norm shifts tend to be sudden when they take place, which is called \tipping."
Third, as norms are one of the population-level multiple equilibria, they tend to exhibit both \local conformity"
and \global diversity." Fourth, normative behaviors depend less on underlying fundamentals than would otherwise
be expected and, therefore, reveal less diversity, summarized by the term \compression." As shown in Section 6, the
centuries-long practice of FGC has swiftly declined in the borderlands of Burkina Faso's neighboring countries since
this country initiated political eorts against the practice. This nding supports the rst and second characteristics.
To explore the remaining features, two additional exercises are performed here.
First, following Eerson et al. (2015), by residential areas, Figure S.8 (top-left panel) illustrates a histogram of the
fraction of respondents circumcised in their (present) community. If FGC is a normative behavior supported under
homogeneous values and preferences in a community, the surveyed communities should exhibit either very high or
very low cutting rates, with the former (latter) seen as an FGC (no-FGC) equilibrium (also, recall the corresponding
discussion provided in Section 2). As seen from this panel, the cutting rates are either one or zero in a signicant
proportion of the surveyed communities, although the communities revealing the interior cutting rates may suggest
that some sort of heterogeneity in people's preferences for this practice exists within and across communities (see also
subsection S.6.3 for more detailed interpretation of the interior cutting rates). This tendency is also more pronounced
in rural areas, as seen in the two panels demonstrated at the bottom of Figure S.8 that show the corresponding
histogram after the DHS communities are separated into rural and urban groups.
Second, taking a conceptually similar approach to that adopted in Bellemare et al. (2015), this study regressed
an indicator for FGC on community xed eects only. As the obtained value of R-squared is 0.734, a signicant
proportion of the variability in FGC is attributed to the community-level factor. Along with the swift decline of FGC
in the borderlands, the (quasi-)discontinuity of the cutting rates shown in Figure S.8, as well as the limited role of
within-community factors in explaining the variation of FGC, seemingly supports the view that FGC is a social norm.
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On the other hand, women's natal communities may play a role in sustaining FGC. These natal communities may
be dierent from the DHS communities for some respondents, because women are typically circumcised in childhood
or puberty, and often marry out of their original village. In addition, according to Mackie (1996)'s theory, the relevant
community is an intra-marrying one that shares a marriage market, which would include both the natal and the
destination villages of married women.59 Therefore, in the top-right panel of Figure S.8, a histogram of the fraction
of those circumcised in their administrative unit is also presented. In the data, the surveyed communities are grouped
into 76 Communes in Benin, 142 Departments in Co^te d'Ivoire, 498 Communes in Mali, and 21 Prefectures in Togo,
resulting in approximately four DHS communities included in each administrative unit on average.60 The obtained
implication is robust to the presumption that the relevant \community" of the present interest spreads over more
extensive areas than those of the DHS communities. The corresponding exercise exploiting administrative-unit xed
eects, rather than community xed eects, again yielded a sizable value of R-squared, 0.680.
S.6.2 Is it a marriage convention?
To gain insight into the question of whether FGC is a social norm particularly supported by men's and women's
inter-dependent expectations operating in marriage markets, by country, Table S.16 reports background information
on FGC. Of particular interest are both women's [panel(A)] and men's [panel(B)] perceived benets of this practice.
While the rule diered somewhat by round and country, male household members aged 15 to 64 (for Benin) or 15 to
54 (for all remaining countries) belonging to approximately 40% of the selected households were also interviewed in
the DHS (see Table S.2 for the country-round breakdown).
The reported information, collected through a yes-no question for each item, is only based on answers provided by
the circumcised women or men residing in a community that recorded at least one circumcised woman.61 As seen from
the table, across both men and women, the fraction of respondents who believed that FGC would improve women's
marriage prospects is small, although it is slightly larger in Co^te d'Ivoire compared to other countries.
On the one hand, this nding may suggest that FGC has no contemporary relationship with women's marriage
although it might have been a marriage convention in the past. On the other hand, the small fraction could still be
59However, these concerns do not necessarily invalidate the ndings yielded by the above exercises. First, if these concerns are crucial,
those exercises would not reveal any meaningful results. Second, the destination communities are often located close to the natal commu-
nities in rural areas. Moreover, parents may even show a greater respect for cultural practices in a community their daughter would marry
into, compared to that practiced in her original community.
60An administrative unit corresponding to each community could not be identied from the DHS data alone. Therefore, this study
matched a community's GPS latitude/longitude coordinates with a country's map sourced from DIVA-GIS (http://www.diva-gis.org/
datadown). Communities for which the ArcGIS failed to uniquely identify the corresponding administrative unit are excluded from the
analysis; the omitted communities correspond to less than 0.1% of the entire sample.
61The corresponding information for the overall sample is also available upon request, although the relevant information provided by
those residing in communities not commonly practicing FGC may not be markedly reliable.
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conceived as being consistent with the view that FGC is a marriage convention. Because the marriage matching at the
FGC equilibrium is random with respect to this practice, both men and women may not identify a discernible marriage
premium from this practice and, therefore, may not answer that this practice improves women's marriageability.
S.6.3 Interior cutting rates
Several communities with cutting rates between zero and one, as shown in Figure S.8, are worth explaining. At least
three reasons could account for the interior cutting rates. First, these cutting rates might pertain to communities that
are shifting from an FGC to a no-FGC equilibrium and thus are not in steady state. Second, such communities may
be cohabited by two ethnic groups, one that traditionally practices FGC and one that does not, and it may be that
the stable equilibrium is achieved in a marriage market of the respective ethnic groups that does not overlap between
them.
Third, within-community heterogeneity may also point toward the interior cutting rates, as analyzed by Eerson
et al. (2015). For example, assume that a community includes two (publicly known) types of men, i.e., those who
place a high intrinsic value on a community's marriage-related custom (i.e., conformists) and those who do not (i.e.,
reformists), whereby the former type is characterized as having b = bh, along with the latter type of b = bl (< bh). In
this case, it would be possible that the equilibrium fraction of circumcised women lies between bh+~c02bh and
bl+~c0
2bl
(i.e.,
interior equilibria).62
The presence of the interior equilibria provides two related implications. First, cutting rates existing (and varying)
between zero and one, as shown in Figure S.8, may suggest that a plausible amount of heterogeneity exists in terms of
the within-community distribution of the types across communities. Second, renements that consider heterogeneous
preferences within and across communities are needed when organizing an anti-FGC association, as proposed by
Mackie (1996). For example, both the FGC and the no-FGC equilibrium (in addition to the interior equilibria) can
still arise even when allowing for heterogeneous preferences within a community.63 Then, consider a shift from the
FGC equilibrium. In Section 2, it was noted that the no-FGC equilibrium is achieved in a self-enforcing manner when
the fraction of circumcised girls in a community is just below b+~c02b . In the aforementioned example, this threshold
value is bl+~c02bl for the reformists. However, inducing
bl ~c0
2bl
(= 1  bl+~c02bl ) fraction of women to refrain from FGC may not
62Whatever the fraction of the respective types, both types of men can choose gc = ~c0 and g0 = 0 at equilibrium, which encourages
women to accept a proposal while making them indierent to the practice of FGC. Assume the equilibrium fraction of circumcised girls in
a community  = H 2 [ bh+~c02bh ;
bl+~c0
2bl
]. Because Hbh   ~c0  (1  H)bh and Hbl   ~c0  (1  H)bl, the conformists (reformists) prefer
to marry circumcised (uncircumcised) women. In response to this choice, some women may choose k = kc and others may choose k = k0.
It is possible that H is achieved at equilibrium.
63When the circumcised fraction is above bl+~c0
2bl
(below bh+~c0
2bh
), the FGC equilibrium (no-FGC equilibrium) arises in a self-enforcing
manner.
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completely eliminate this practice. This is because the conformists still prefer to marry circumcised women provided
more than bh+~c02bh fraction of women practice FGC. While these discussions were based on the marriage coordination
model, the logic is quite general and applies to any mechanisms supporting the normative equilibrium.
S.7 Policy considerations
Several analyses conducted in this study provided some support for the view that FGC is a normative equilibrium. If
so, community-based interventions would be eective for the eradication of FGC rather than strategies providing each
of the community members with an individual (e.g., monetary) incentive. According to Young (2015), coordination,
social pressure, or the symbolic signaling of group membership often supports normative behaviors. Thus, future
research identifying which of these mechanisms maintains FGC and who supports this normative institution would be
helpful in optimizing policy interventions.
Related to this point, two major demand-side policy interventions currently in use include creating an anti-FGC
association that facilitates a public declaration to abandon FGC, as put forth by Mackie (1996), and organizing
alternative initiation rituals.64 The latter strategy is proposed, as FGC often takes places as a rite of passage into
adulthood (see Mackie, 2000, for example).
Both approaches may potentially eliminate FGC if a sucient number of people crossing a crucial group threshold
agree to its abandonment as a result of these interventions. Importantly, if FGC is a social norm, coordinating women's
marriage and forming a public association that includes a great number of potential grooms and brides (and their
parents) who pledge not to practice FGC may be required. Similarly, if social pressure from circumcised women of
the same generation facilitates FGC, the relevant association would have to include such peers as critical members. If
FGC is sustained by signaling the subordination of young girls to female elders, alternative initiation rites may halt
FGC only when elders interpret young girls' participation in those rituals as a sign of respect to the elders. Relevant
future research possibly involving randomized controlled trials should be carefully designed to disentangle underlying
factors of this kind.
On the other hand, as the underlying mechanisms may not be mutually exclusive, it would be practical to implement
experimental interventions (e.g., community-based education programs) that have particular target groups (e.g., males,
females, elders, peers). Targeted groups may also have to include those who place a high intrinsic value on FGC when
substantial heterogeneity in preferences for this practice is likely to exist within and across communities.
64Supply-side interventions include monetary compensation for cutters who stop FGC and/or legal punishment for parents who compelled
daughters to get circumcised as well as cutters.
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Esri, HERE, DeLorme, MapmyIndia, ' OpenStreetMap contributors, and the GIS user
community
Figure S.1: Position of DHS communities (blue circle), violence incidence (red square), an area of my survey (green
polygon), and Burkina Faso (red polygon)
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Figure S.2: Proportion of circumcised population by the year of birth: Burkina Faso
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Figure S.3: Impacts on FGC by dierent threshold years of birth and distances to the border to Burkina Faso
Note: This gure reports the estimated 2 in equation (9) with 95% condence intervals by changing the denition of Dijt and Bj .
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Figure S.4: Impacts on FGC by age X
Note: This gure reports the estimated eects (2) on the likelihood of being cut before reaching the ages of X years with 95% condence
intervals.
Esri, HERE, DeLorme, MapmyIndia, ' OpenStreetMap contributors, and the GIS user
community
Figure S.5: Ethnic homelands by Murdock (1959)'s classication, analyzed countries (red), and ethnic homelands
stretching over Burkina Faso and the analyzed countries (blue)
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Figure S.6: Impacts on females aged M or below (OLS)
Notes: (1) This gure reports the estimated 2 in equation (9) with 95% condence intervals by changing the exploited sample by the
respondents' age. (2) Age M in the horizontal axis means that the estimation uses data pertaining to female respondents aged 15 to M
years. (3) The estimations of the likelihoods of being sewn closed and by traditional cutters control for an indicator for FGC.
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Figure S.7: Districts by the IPUMS's classication, Benin (yellow), Burkina Faso (blue), Mali (red), and Benin's and
Mali's districts whose centroids are located within 30 km distance to Burkina Faso (green)
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Figure S.8: Distribution of cutting rates across spaces
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Table S.1: Checking on the parallel trends of cutting rates before 1990 (OLS)
Dependent variable: One if cut
(a) (b)
Born in 1989 -0.048*** -0.049***
(0.008) (0.008)
Born in 1988 -0.038*** -0.041***
(0.007) (0.007)
Born in 1987 -0.028*** -0.029***
(0.007) (0.007)
Born in 1986 -0.040*** -0.044***
(0.006) (0.006)
Born in 1985 -0.036*** -0.036***
(0.006) (0.006)
Born in 1984 -0.029*** -0.030***
(0.006) (0.005)
Born in 1983 -0.021*** -0.027***
(0.006) (0.006)
Born in 1982 -0.021*** -0.023***
(0.005) (0.005)
Born in 1981 -0.011** -0.013**
(0.006) (0.005)
Born in 1980 -0.011* -0.012**
(0.006) (0.006)
Located within a 30-km distance to BF
 Born in 1989 -0.016 0.001
(0.042) (0.042)
 Born in 1988 -0.039 -0.034
(0.035) (0.034)
 Born in 1987 -0.040 -0.034
(0.036) (0.035)
 Born in 1986 0.010 0.012
(0.034) (0.033)
 Born in 1985 -0.023 -0.015
(0.034) (0.035)
 Born in 1984 -0.014 -0.010
(0.035) (0.034)
 Born in 1983 -0.031 -0.026
(0.033) (0.034)
 Born in 1982 0.036 0.043
(0.028) (0.028)
 Born in 1981 0.023 0.016
(0.035) (0.036)
 Born in 1980 -0.009 -0.014
(0.028) (0.025)
Individual controls NO YES
Country-ethnicity FE NO YES
Community FE YES YES
Year-of-interview FE NO YES
All interactions = 0 (p-values) 0.823 0.837
R-squared 0.745 0.770
No. of obs. 60594 60270
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each community. (3) The individual controls include birth order and religion dummies
(Islam and Christianity).
64
Table S.2: Sample composition
DHS No. of No. of No. of
round respondents households communities
(A) Female sample
Benin 2001 6219 4256 247
2011{12 16522 12365 746
Co^te d'Ivoire 1998{99 3040 1598 140
2011{12 9800 6468 341
Mali 2001 12774 2105 399
2006 14506 10447 405
2012{13 10424 7973 413
Togo 2013{14 9480 6837 330
Total 82765 52049 3021
(B) Male sample
Benin 2001 2709 2059 247
2011{12 5153 3983 746
Co^te d'Ivoire 1998{99 886 531 140
2011{12 4999 3380 341
Mali 2001 3394 1221 398
2006 4183 3089 405
2012{13 4399 3514 413
Togo 2013{14 4476 3327 330
Total 30199 21104 3020
65
Table S.3: Summary statistics (DID)
Coecient Standard R-sqd No. of
Dependent variables: errors obs
One if cut -0.165*** (0.044) 0.015 72266
One if sewn closed (zero if not cut) -0.031** (0.015) 0.000 64492
One if cut by traditional cutters (zero if not cut) -0.166*** (0.041) 0.014 71971
Age at FGC if cut -0.363 (0.591) 0.004 17889
One if marriedy -0.023 (0.036) 0.114 35791
One if ever had sexy -0.038 (0.028) 0.070 35478
One if gave birthy -0.061* (0.032) 0.098 35791
Age at rst marriagey 0.658*** (0.194) 0.006 20810
Age at rst sexy 0.230 (0.164) 0.002 27431
Age at rst birthy 0.643*** (0.218) 0.014 18734
No. of childreny -0.358*** (0.087) 0.123 35791
Education (years)y -0.268 (0.315) 0.061 35755
One if polygynyz -0.020 (0.040) 0.006 19987
No. of a husband's wivesz -0.032 (0.052) 0.005 19769
A husband's education (years)z 0.440 (0.404) 0.011 18628
A husband's agez -0.216 (0.691) 0.027 19171
Family wealth index (1 to 5)z 0.130 (0.157) 0.020 14083
One if inter-ethnic marriagez -0.148*** (0.055) 0.002 5334
One if have DM powerz -0.042 (0.029) 0.002 19397
One if had any IPVz -0.010 (0.057) 0.004 7154
One if migranty -0.074 (0.057) 0.018 14908
Weight (kg)y -0.648 (0.652) 0.009 28939
Height (cm)y -0.031 (0.476) 0.011 28954
Height for age (z-scores)y 0.002 (0.069) 0.005 28746
BMI  10y -3.518 (2.314) 0.003 28814
Hemoglobin (g/dl)y -0.117 (0.152) 0.013 13450
One if had genital sore/ulcery -0.012 (0.013) 0.002 32337
One if had genital dischargey 0.021 (0.017) 0.005 32345
One if had terminated pregnancyy -0.008 (0.014) 0.011 34212
Birth order 0.071 (0.107) 0.001 82765
One if Muslim 0.016 (0.043) 0.009 82656
One if Christian 0.036 (0.039) 0.011 82656
Urban (dummy) -0.026 (0.035) 0.016 82765
No. of battles ( 10) -0.065 (0.067) 0.005 82765
Notes: (1) In this table, it was assessed whether temporal changes in the mean values of several variables reported in Table 1 that are
relevant to the respondents born before and after 1990 were statistically equal between the border and the inland communities, and the
resulting DID estimates are reported. (2) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (3)
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each community. (4) The information is relevant only to
the respondents aged 25 or below for y, married respondents aged 25 or below for z, and all the respondents aged 49 or below for the
remaining.
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Table S.4: Impacts on married females aged 25 or below: Decision making power and intimate partner violence (OLS)
Dependent variables: One if have DM power One if had IPV
Health Large Visit Any Any Any
care household family or emotional physical sexual
purchases relatives
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f)
Located within a 30-km distance to BF
 Born in or after 1990 -0.000 -0.001 -0.076*** -0.124 -0.051 -0.060
(0.025) (0.028) (0.029) (0.078) (0.059) (0.044)
Birth order -0.002** -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Muslim 0.001 -0.007 -0.012 -0.083*** -0.058** -0.019
(0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.024) (0.029) (0.018)
Christian 0.013 0.010 0.014 -0.061** -0.057* 0.000
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.026) (0.029) (0.016)
R-squared 0.238 0.240 0.282 0.364 0.302 0.314
No. of obs. 19307 19302 19304 7119 7119 7120
Country-ethnicity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-of-birth FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Community FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-of-interview FE YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample DHS
Benin 2001 YES YES YES NO NO NO
Benin 2011-12 YES YES YES NO NO NO
Co^te d'Ivoire 1998-99 NO NO NO NO NO NO
Co^te d'Ivoire 2011-12 YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mali 2001 YES YES YES NO NO NO
Mali 2006 YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mali 2012-13 YES YES YES YES YES YES
Togo 2013-14 YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each community.
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Table S.5: Robustness checks on marriage eects on females aged 25 or below (OLS)
Battle Household Time Recent Permanent Battle Household Time Recent Permanent
FE trend DHS residents FE trend DHS residents
Dependent variables: One if married Age at rst marriage
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (1f) (1g) (1h) (1i) (1j)
Born in and after 1990
 Located within a 30-km 0.016 0.078 0.091* 0.074* -0.092 0.678** 0.358 0.663 0.720** 1.195
distance to BF (0.041) (0.118) (0.056) (0.042) (0.063) (0.284) (1.468) (0.467) (0.321) (0.736)
 No. of battles ( 10) 0.008*** - - - - -0.110*** - - - -
within 40 km (0.003) (0.030)
R-squared 0.492 0.878 0.560 0.495 0.508 0.351 0.883 0.464 0.360 0.350
No. of obs. 35645 35791 35645 19264 7947 20706 20810 20706 9766 5040
Dependent variables: One if ever had sex Age at rst sex
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f) (2g) (2h) (2i) (2j)
Born in and after 1990
 Located within a 30-km -0.006 0.016 -0.024 0.049** -0.095* 0.160 -0.364 -0.238 0.197 0.463
distance to BF (0.033) (0.104) (0.040) (0.024) (0.057) (0.214) (1.363) (0.339) (0.241) (0.427)
 No. of battles ( 10) -0.000 - - - - -0.053*** - - - -
within 40 km (0.002) (0.017)
R-squared 0.412 0.830 0.509 0.443 0.479 0.294 0.857 0.393 0.306 0.327
No. of obs. 35332 35478 35332 18984 7931 27305 27431 27305 14416 5743
Dependent variables: One if ever gave birth Age at rst birth
(3a) (3b) (3c) (3d) (3e) (3f) (3g) (3h) (3i) (3j)
Born in or after 1990
 Located within a 30-km -0.006 -0.058 0.117** 0.028 -0.050 0.370 -0.498 0.292 0.437 -2.128***
distance to BF (0.028) (0.143) (0.047) (0.027) (0.055) (0.257) (1.681) (0.578) (0.274) (0.379)
 No. of battles ( 10) 0.009*** - - - - -0.090*** - - - -
within 40 km (0.003) (0.028)
R-squared 0.467 0.860 0.524 0.477 0.510 0.334 0.886 0.455 0.358 0.364
No. of obs. 35645 35791 35645 19264 7947 18651 18734 18651 9480 4152
Dependent variables: No. of children Education (years)
(4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) (4e) (4f) (4g) (4h) (4i) (4j)
Born in or after 1990
 Located within a 30-km -0.320*** -0.286 0.038 -0.356*** -0.320* -0.520* 0.228 -0.833** -0.732** 0.315
distance to BF (0.081) (0.306) (0.129) (0.104) (0.171) (0.266) (0.935) (0.388) (0.302) (0.555)
 No. of battles ( 10) 0.058*** - - - - -0.135*** - - - -
within 40 km (0.007) (0.032)
R-squared 0.530 0.882 0.603 0.518 0.578 0.449 0.858 0.511 0.426 0.535
No. of obs. 35645 35791 35645 19264 7947 35609 35755 35609 19259 7928
Birth order YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Religion YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Country-ethnicity FE YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Year-of-birth FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Community FE YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Year-of-interview FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity in columns (1h), (2h), and (3h) (due to computational diculty), whereas they are robust to heteroskedasticity and
clustered residuals within each community in the remaining columns.
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Table S.6: Robustness checks on marriage eects on married females aged 25 or below (OLS)
Battle Household Time Recent Permanent Battle Household Time Recent Permanent
FE trend DHS residents FE trend DHS residents
Dependent variables: One if polygyny Total no. of a husband's wives
(1a) (1b) (1c) (1d) (1e) (1f) (1g) (1h) (1i) (1j)
Born in or after 1990
 Located within a 30-km 0.027 0.031 0.063 0.031 -0.037 0.034 0.023 0.014 0.056 -0.109
distance to BF (0.050) (0.116) (0.080) (0.056) (0.267) (0.064) (0.180) (0.110) (0.069) (0.218)
 No. of battles ( 10) 0.016*** - - - - 0.018*** - - - -
within 40 km (0.005) (0.006)
R-squared 0.243 0.865 0.357 0.276 0.294 0.257 0.860 0.363 0.303 0.302
No. of obs. 19886 19987 19886 9393 4835 19669 19769 19669 9301 4762
Dependent variables: A husband's education (years) A husband's age (years)
(2a) (2b) (2c) (2d) (2e) (2f) (2g) (2h) (2i) (2j)
Born in or after 1990
 Located within a 30-km 0.058 -1.009 -0.988 0.205 -0.989 -0.515 2.215 -1.495 -0.157 -4.141
distance to BF (0.345) (1.093) (0.656) (0.386) (0.811) (0.791) (2.744) (1.439) (0.871) (3.192)
 No. of battles ( 10) -0.126* - - - - 0.179** - - - -
within 40 km (0.067) (0.089)
R-squared 0.468 0.928 0.572 0.498 0.523 0.298 0.882 0.421 0.301 0.385
No. of obs. 18530 18628 18530 9107 4608 19072 19171 19072 9282 4779
Dependent variables: Wealth index (1 to 5) One if inter-ethnic marriage
(3a) (3b) (3c) (3d) (3e) (3f) (3g) (3h) (3i) (3j)
Born in or after 1990
 Located within a 30-km -0.076 - -0.074 -0.064 0.040 0.044 0.034 0.094 0.066 0.061
distance to BF (0.084) (0.181) (0.091) (0.274) (0.059) (0.181) (0.161) (0.064) (0.210)
 No. of battles ( 10) -0.001 - - - - 0.014 - - - -
within 40 km (0.008) (0.019)
R-squared 0.734 - 0.775 0.765 0.678 0.602 0.953 0.775 0.636 0.728
No. of obs. 14038 - 14038 9393 2610 5304 5334 5304 2962 1029
Dependent variables: One if have DM power One if had any IPV
(4a) (4b) (4c) (4d) (4e) (4f) (4g) (4h) (4i) (4j)
Born in or after 1990
 Located within a 30-km -0.050 -0.142 -0.086 -0.058 0.064 -0.140* - -0.129 -0.141 -0.039
distance to BF (0.034) (0.222) (0.082) (0.036) (0.141) (0.076) - (0.139) (0.092) (0.319)
 No. of battles ( 10) -0.001 - - - - -0.005 - - - -
within 40 km (0.005) (0.007)
R-squared 0.274 0.864 0.393 0.296 0.371 0.343 - 0.496 0.390 0.358
No. of obs. 19297 19397 19297 9382 4834 7117 - 7117 3645 1957
Birth order YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Religion YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Country-ethnicity FE YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Year-of-birth FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Community FE YES NO YES YES YES YES NO YES YES YES
Year-of-interview FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each community in all columns but (due to computational diculty) columns (1c), (1h),
(2c), and (2h). (3) The estimation result in column (3b) is not reported because family wealth is measured at the household level. (4) The
estimation result in column (4g) is not reported due to computational diculty.
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Table S.7: Impacts on FGC by country (OLS)
Dependent variable: One if One if One if One if One if One if One if One if
cut cut by sewn traditional cut cut by sewn traditional
age 10 closed cutters age 10 closed cutters
(zero if (zero if (zero if (zero if
not cut) not cut) not cut) not cut)
Country: Benin Co^te d'Ivoire
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
(A) Located within a 30-km distance to BF
 Born in or after 1990 -0.016 -0.020 -0.071 -0.012 -0.051 -0.075 -0.001 0.023
(0.101) (0.086) (0.070) (0.011) (0.128) (0.142) (0.037) (0.021)
Birth order - - - - 0.003* 0.004** 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Muslim 0.034*** 0.035*** -0.008 -0.003 0.228*** 0.230*** 0.007 0.007
(0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.004) (0.024) (0.024) (0.005) (0.012)
Christian 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 -0.103*** -0.089*** -0.001 0.009
(0.007) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.015) (0.015) (0.004) (0.007)
One if cut - - 0.125*** 0.890*** - - 0.080*** 0.826***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015)
R-squared 0.564 0.541 0.245 0.918 0.510 0.419 0.257 0.811
No. of obs. 17387 17387 17148 17380 12054 12054 11432 11940
(B) Located within a 40-km distance to BF
 Born in or after 1995 -0.123 -0.108* -0.136*** -0.027*** -0.248** -0.300*** 0.009 -0.040**
(0.077) (0.064) (0.046) (0.010) (0.105) (0.114) (0.016) (0.019)
One if cut - - 0.125*** 0.890*** - - 0.080*** 0.826***
(0.016) (0.012) (0.010) (0.015)
R-squared 0.565 0.541 0.246 0.918 0.510 0.419 0.257 0.811
No. of obs. 17387 17387 17148 17380 12054 12054 11432 11940
Country: Mali Togo
(i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
(A) Located within a 30-km distance to BF
 Born in or after 1990 -0.070*** -0.071** -0.004 0.020 -0.118** -0.059* -0.093*** 0.002
(0.024) (0.028) (0.016) (0.024) (0.048) (0.030) (0.023) (0.003)
Birth order 0.002*** 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
Muslim 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.030*** -0.012 0.192*** 0.141*** -0.019** -0.003
(0.008) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010) (0.019) (0.016) (0.008) (0.002)
Christian -0.098*** -0.101*** 0.018 -0.001 0.018** 0.014* -0.001 0.001
(0.020) (0.022) (0.013) (0.014) (0.009) (0.007) (0.004) (0.001)
One if cut - - 0.109*** 0.850*** - - 0.198*** 0.956***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.033) (0.010)
R-squared 0.535 0.388 0.299 0.537 0.393 0.312 0.332 0.960
No. of obs. 35488 35488 28697 35323 6992 6992 6911 6984
(B) Located within a 40-km distance to BF
 Born in or after 1995 -0.068** -0.070** -0.019 0.040 -0.080* -0.053* -0.074*** 0.001
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.040) (0.041) (0.030) (0.018) (0.003)
One if cut - - 0.109*** 0.850*** - - 0.200*** 0.956***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.035) (0.010)
R-squared 0.535 0.388 0.299 0.537 0.391 0.311 0.326 0.960
No. of obs. 35488 35488 28697 35323 6992 6992 6911 6984
Country-ethnicity FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-of-birth FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Community FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-of-interview FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each community.
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Table S.8: Marriage eects by country (OLS)
Country: Benin Co^te d'Ivore
Coecient Standard R-sqd No. of Coecient Standard R-sqd No. of
Dependent variables: errors obs. errors obs.
(A) Females aged 25 or below
One if married 0.142 (0.173) 0.533 9580 0.108 (0.153) 0.429 5892
One if ever had sex 0.099 (0.085) 0.461 9316 -0.011 (0.025) 0.415 5882
One if ever gave birth -0.024 (0.069) 0.505 9580 0.120* (0.062) 0.445 5892
Age at rst marriage 0.615 (0.898) 0.336 4835 0.724 (0.599) 0.338 2547
Age at rst sex 0.629 (0.602) 0.312 6958 -0.364 (0.336) 0.264 4766
Age at rst birth -0.057 (1.067) 0.363 4456 1.094*** (0.369) 0.316 2827
No. of children -0.359 (0.313) 0.532 9580 -0.081 (0.207) 0.480 5892
Education (years) -0.497 (0.612) 0.438 9579 -1.486** (0.688) 0.373 5888
(B) Married females aged 25 or below
One if polygyny -0.110 (0.182) 0.304 4643 0.124 (0.097) 0.261 2389
Total no. of a husband's wives -0.076 (0.186) 0.315 4582 0.198 (0.147) 0.253 2378
A husband's education (years) 2.090** (1.016) 0.503 4312 0.347 (0.939) 0.445 1714
A husband's age (years) -1.751 (2.748) 0.323 4629 -0.824 (2.267) 0.302 1711
Wealth index (1 to 5) -0.163 (0.189) 0.723 3115 -0.105 (0.273) 0.802 1818
One if inter-ethnic marriage -0.039 (0.064) 0.720 1329 0.478*** (0.167) 0.597 611
One if have DM power -0.081 (0.102) 0.283 4642 -0.165* (0.085) 0.278 1808
One if had any IPV - - - - 0.073 (0.133) 0.314 1349
Country: Mali Togo
Coecient Standard R-sqd No. of Coecient Standard R-sqd No. of
Dependent variables: errors obs. errors obs.
(A) Females aged 25 or below
One if married -0.017 (0.043) 0.438 16387 -0.044 (0.060) 0.451 3786
One if ever had sex 0.003 (0.042) 0.405 16350 -0.050 (0.037) 0.457 3784
One if ever gave birth 0.004 (0.035) 0.444 16387 -0.097** (0.044) 0.450 3786
Age at rst marriage 0.808** (0.403) 0.246 11740 0.493 (0.563) 0.368 1584
Age at rst sex 0.175 (0.324) 0.239 12877 0.127 (0.388) 0.326 2704
Age at rst birth 0.412 (0.359) 0.260 9829 0.203 (0.499) 0.369 1539
No. of children -0.306*** (0.094) 0.532 16387 -0.484*** (0.185) 0.479 3786
Education (years) -0.047 (0.320) 0.384 16357 -0.485 (0.674) 0.436 3785
(B) Married females aged 25 or below
One if polygyny 0.007 (0.063) 0.208 11346 0.054 (0.116) 0.280 1508
Total no. of a husband's wives -0.014 (0.087) 0.208 11209 0.072 (0.117) 0.286 1500
A husband's education (years) -0.581 (0.361) 0.376 11026 0.397 (0.910) 0.505 1478
A husband's age (years) -0.078 (1.090) 0.267 11228 -0.902 (1.407) 0.323 1504
Wealth index (1 to 5) -0.083 (0.110) 0.693 7597 -0.021 (0.172) 0.843 1508
One if inter-ethnic marriage -0.017 (0.061) 0.555 2801 -0.057 (0.090) 0.662 563
One if have DM power -0.068 (0.044) 0.267 11340 0.058 (0.074) 0.323 1507
One if had any IPV -0.190* (0.113) 0.351 4556 -0.164 (0.127) 0.359 1212
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each community. (3) The exploited sample and controls correspond to those used in Table
4 and Table 5.
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Table S.9: Treatment eects of \Border ethnic homelands by Murdock (1959)  Born in or after 1990" (OLS)
Coecient Standard R-sqd. No. of
Dependent variables: errors obs.
(A) Impacts on FGC
One if cut -0.071*** (0.013) 0.762 71921
One if cut by age 10 -0.064*** (0.012) 0.699 71921
One if sewn closed (zero if not cut)y 0.000 (0.007) 0.307 64188
One if traditional cutters (zero if not cut)y 0.002 (0.008) 0.819 71627
(B) Marriage eects on females aged 25 or below
One if married -0.021 (0.019) 0.492 35645
One if ever had sex -0.010 (0.017) 0.412 35332
One if ever gave birth -0.024 (0.016) 0.467 35645
Age at rst marriage 0.418*** (0.157) 0.351 20706
Age at rst sex 0.166 (0.117) 0.294 27305
Age at rst birth 0.418*** (0.152) 0.334 18651
No. of children -0.259*** (0.048) 0.528 35645
Education (years) -0.023 (0.160) 0.448 35609
(C) Marriage eects on married females aged 25 or below
One if polygyny -0.006 (0.029) 0.242 19886
Total no. of a husband's wives 0.004 (0.036) 0.256 19669
A husband's education (years) -0.088 (0.195) 0.468 18530
A husband's age (years) -0.462 (0.483) 0.298 19072
Wealth index (1 to 5) 0.027 (0.049) 0.734 14038
One if inter-ethnic marriage 0.082* (0.048) 0.603 5304
One if have DM power 0.010 (0.022) 0.274 19297
One if had any IPV -0.063 (0.042) 0.343 7117
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each community. (3) An indicator for circumcised women is included in regressors for y.
(4) The regressors include all controls exploited in Table 2 [panel (A)], Table 4 [panel (B)], and Table 5 [panel (C)].
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Table S.10: Treatment eects: A sub-sample of the respondents residing within a 60-km distance to Burkina Faso
(OLS)
Coecient Standard R-sqd. No. of
Dependent variables: errors obs.
(A) Impacts on FGC
One if cut -0.070** (0.029) 0.678 7242
One if cut by age 10 -0.042* (0.025) 0.597 7242
One if sewn closed (zero if not cut)y -0.029 (0.019) 0.331 6268
One if traditional cutters (zero if not cut)y 0.014 (0.016) 0.834 7204
(B) Marriage eects on females aged 25 or below
One if married 0.038 (0.050) 0.523 3287
One if ever had sex 0.022 (0.040) 0.453 3263
One if ever gave birth 0.006 (0.038) 0.533 3287
Age at rst marriage 0.653* (0.361) 0.254 2210
Age at rst sex 0.029 (0.283) 0.253 2512
Age at rst birth 0.147 (0.354) 0.314 1938
No. of children -0.131 (0.115) 0.580 3287
Education (years) -0.581* (0.345) 0.449 3279
(C) Marriage eects on married females aged 25 or below
One if polygyny 0.074 (0.068) 0.237 2157
Total no. of a husband's wives 0.086 (0.082) 0.261 2132
A husband's education (years) 0.081 (0.395) 0.434 2100
A husband's age (years) -0.739 (1.150) 0.289 2127
Wealth index (1 to 5) -0.158 (0.113) 0.653 1592
One if inter-ethnic marriage -0.080 (0.078) 0.728 659
One if have DM power -0.071* (0.042) 0.248 2141
One if had any IPV -0.143 (0.111) 0.401 860
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each community. (3) An indicator for circumcised women is included in regressors for y.
(4) The regressors include all controls exploited in Table 2 [panel (A)], Table 4 [panel (B)], and Table 5 [panel (C)].
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Table S.11: Summary statistics: Respondents born before 1990 and residing within a 60-km distance to Burkina Faso
Distance to BF
 30 km > 30 km &  60 km
Mean Std. No. of Mean Std. No. of
obs. obs.
One if cut 0.71 0.45 2818 0.70 0.45 3265
One if sewn closed (zero if not cut) 0.06 0.25 2400 0.06 0.24 2858
One if cut by traditional cutters 0.66 0.47 2802 0.65 0.47 3244
(zero if not cut)
Age at FGC if cut 6.85** 3.91 966 7.27 3.95 1075
One if marriedy 0.81 0.38 847 0.80 0.39 1063
One if ever had sexy 0.87 0.32 844 0.88 0.31 1050
One if gave birthy 0.75 0.43 847 0.73 0.43 1063
Age at rst marriagey 16.05 2.53 707 16.24 2.81 881
Age at rst sexy 15.80 2.24 741 15.76 2.37 931
Age at rst birthy 17.16* 2.52 636 17.40 2.66 786
No. of childreny 1.82 1.53 847 1.74 1.50 1063
Education (years)y 1.05*** 2.59 845 1.46 3.05 1061
One if polygynyz 0.36 0.48 693 0.34 0.47 861
No. of a husband's wivesz 1.43 0.64 686 1.42 0.65 852
A husband's education (years)z 1.20 2.97 668 1.44 3.46 835
A husband's agez 31.96 7.99 680 32.19 7.82 846
Family wealth index (1 to 5)z 2.31** 1.20 442 2.51 1.38 536
One if inter-ethnic marriagez 0.26 0.44 208 0.20 0.40 245
One if have DM powerz 0.21* 0.41 685 0.17 0.38 854
One if had any IPVz 0.28 0.45 287 0.23 0.42 311
One if migranty 0.50 0.50 627 0.49 0.50 814
Weight (kg)y 54.25 7.32 756 53.99 7.89 962
Height (cm)y 159.74 6.74 753 159.28 6.63 961
Height for age (z-scores)y -0.60 1.01 751 -0.68 1.01 958
BMI  10y 212.52 27.51 753 212.67 27.92 961
Hemoglobin (g/dl)y 11.46 1.68 304 11.45 1.68 395
One if had genital sore/ulcery 0.07 0.25 814 0.08 0.27 980
One if had genital dischargey 0.13 0.34 817 0.12 0.33 983
One if had terminated pregnancyy 0.09 0.28 834 0.07 0.26 1044
Birth order 3.34 2.10 3006 3.35 2.05 3476
One if Muslim 0.55*** 0.49 3004 0.67 0.46 3470
One if Christian 0.19*** 0.39 3004 0.16 0.37 3470
Urban (dummy) 0.11*** 0.32 3006 0.20 0.40 3476
No. of battles ( 10) 0.09*** 0.28 3006 0.05 0.16 3476
Notes: (1) The equality of means between the respondents residing within a 30-km distance to Burkina Faso and the remaining respondents
are examined by T-tests. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) The information is relevant only to the respondents
aged 25 or below for y, married respondents aged 25 or below for z, and all the respondents aged 49 or below for the remaining.
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Table S.12: Robustness checks on non-linear models
Estimation Odds Standard R-sqd. No. of
ratio errors obs.
Dependent variables: exp(2)
(A) Impacts on FGC
One if cut Logit 0.674* (0.150) 0.607 71921
One if cut by age 10 Logit 0.850 (0.171) 0.543 71921
One if sewn closed (zero if not cut)y Logit 0.798 (0.262) 0.064 32674
One if traditional cutters (zero if not cut)y Logit 0.866 (0.278) 0.085 40141
(B) Marriage eects on females aged 25 or below
One if married Logit 0.910 (0.155) 0.163 35645
One if ever had sex Logit 0.900 (0.142) 0.121 35332
One if ever gave birth Logit 0.759* (0.113) 0.135 35645
Age at rst marriage Ordered logit 1.312** (0.163) 0.029 20706
Age at rst sex Ordered logit 1.081 (0.139) 0.020 27305
Age at rst birth Ordered logit 1.363** (0.182) 0.022 18651
No. of children Ordered logit 0.705*** (0.094) 0.084 35645
Education (years) Ordered logit 1.065 (0.186) 0.058 35609
(C) Marriage eects on married females aged 25 or below
One if polygyny Logit 0.961 (0.186) 0.030 19886
Total no. of a husband's wives Ordered logit 0.973 (0.186) 0.025 19669
A husband's education (years) Ordered logit 1.417 (0.309) 0.051 18530
A husband's age (years) Ordered logit 0.937 (0.157) 0.017 19072
Wealth index (1 to 5) Ordered logit 1.219 (0.262) 0.054 14038
One if inter-ethnic marriage Logit 0.486* (0.199) 0.102 5304
One if have DM power Logit 0.695* (0.147) 0.018 19297
One if had any IPV Logit 0.821 (0.222) 0.054 7117
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each community. (3) Due to computational reasons, all circumcised women are excluded
from the estimations for y. (4) The regressors include all controls exploited in Table 2 [panel (A)], Table 4 [panel (B)], and Table 5 [panel
(C)].
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Table S.13: Robustness checks on multiple-hypothesis testing (OLS)
Coecient Original Adjusted p-values R-sqd No. of
p-values Bonferroni Holm (1979) Hochberg (1988) obs.
Dependent variables: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
(A) Impacts on FGC
One if cut -0.068*** (0.010) (0.135) (0.116) (0.111) 0.761 71921
One if sewn closed -0.055*** (0.002) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) 0.307 64188
(zero if not cut)y
One if traditional cutters 0.005 (0.634) (1.000) (1.000) (0.803) 0.819 71627
(zero if not cut)y
(B) Marriage eects on females aged 25 or below
One if married 0.010 (0.804) (1.000) (1.000) (0.803) 0.492 35645
Age at rst marriage 0.733** (0.010) (0.141) (0.116) (0.111) 0.351 20706
No. of children -0.368*** (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.528 35645
Education (years) -0.409 (0.125) (1.000) (1.000) (0.803) 0.448 35609
(C) Marriage eects on married females aged 25 or below
One if polygyny 0.019 (0.702) (1.000) (1.000) (0.803) 0.242 19886
A husband's education (years) 0.116 (0.735) (1.000) (1.000) (0.803) 0.468 18530
A husband's age (years) -0.598 (0.448) (1.000) (1.000) (0.803) 0.298 19072
Wealth index (1 to 5) -0.076 (0.363) (1.000) (1.000) (0.803) 0.734 14038
One if inter-ethnic marriage 0.037 (0.520) (1.000) (1.000) (0.803) 0.602 5304
One if have DM power -0.049 (0.151) (1.000) (1.000) (0.803) 0.274 19297
One if had any IPV -0.136* (0.073) (1.000) (0.730) (0.730) 0.343 7117
Notes: (1) *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%, corresponding to the original p-values based on the estimation results
reported in Table 2 [panel (A)], Table 4 [panel (B)], and Table 5 [panel (C)]. (2) An indicator for circumcised women is included in regressors
for y. (3) The regressors include all controls exploited in Table 2 [panel (A)], Table 4 [panel (B)], and Table 5 [panel (C)].
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Table S.14: Robustness checks on standard errors clustered at dierent levels (OLS)
Levels of clustering DHS communities Administrative units Ethnic homelands by Murdock (1959)
Coecient p-values No. of Coecient p-values No. of Coecient p-values No. of
obs. obs. obs.
Dependent variables: (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i)
(A) Impacts on FGC
One if cut -0.068*** (0.010) 71921 -0.068** (0.018) 71828 -0.068* (0.091) 71596
One if sewn closed -0.055*** (0.002) 64188 -0.054** (0.026) 64108 -0.055** (0.043) 63896
(zero if not cut)y
One if traditional cutters 0.005 (0.634) 71627 0.005 (0.683) 71535 0.005 (0.641) 71302
(zero if not cut)y
(B) Marriage eects on females aged 25 or below
One if married 0.010 (0.804) 35645 0.011 (0.771) 35609 0.010 (0.817) 35477
Age at rst marriage 0.733** (0.010) 20706 0.772*** (0.002) 20680 0.728** (0.018) 20643
No. of children -0.368*** (0.000) 35645 -0.371*** (0.000) 35609 -0.367*** (0.000) 35477
Education (years) -0.409 (0.125) 35609 -0.336 (0.173) 35573 -0.415 (0.112) 35441
(C) Marriage eects on married females aged 25 or below
One if polygyny 0.019 (0.702) 19886 0.024 (0.565) 19860 0.020 (0.742) 19827
A husband's education (years) 0.116 (0.735) 18530 0.166 (0.640) 18509 0.114 (0.749) 18487
A husband's age (years) -0.598 (0.448) 19072 -0.777 (0.212) 19050 -0.597 (0.435) 19028
Wealth index (1 to 5) -0.076 (0.363) 14038 -0.086 (0.262) 14017 -0.075 (0.327) 13994
One if inter-ethnic marriage 0.037 (0.520) 5304 0.037 (0.530) 5301 0.041 (0.318) 5289
One if have DM power -0.049 (0.151) 19297 -0.041 (0.279) 19275 -0.049 (0.140) 19253
One if had any IPV -0.136* (0.073) 7117 -0.143** (0.015) 7105 -0.136*** (0.006) 7082
Notes: (1) *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) An indicator for circumcised women is included in regressors for y.
(3) The regressors include all controls exploited in Table 2 [panel (A)], Table 4 [panel (B)], and Table 5 [panel (C)].
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Table S.15: Selected relocation and health: Females aged 15 to 25 or below, Benin's and Mali's Census (OLS)
One if One if No. of One if One if No. of One if One if
migrant any death deaths married ever children complete complete
in HH in HH gave ever primary secondary
in the in the birth born education education
last last
year year
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h)
Administrative units located within a 30-km distance to BF
 Born in or after 1990 -0.028 -0.003 -0.002 -0.066*** -0.061*** -0.159*** -0.006 -0.006
(0.020) (0.003) (0.003) (0.021) (0.012) (0.055) (0.023) (0.006)
Mean y for 0.143 0.049 0.056 0.643 0.572 1.376 0.149 0.018
those born before 1990
R-squared 0.160 0.011 0.010 0.300 0.299 0.300 0.200 0.068
No. of obs. 609040 594869 595725 617611 571978 571978 617351 617351
Year-of-birth FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Administrative-unit FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year-of-census FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Sample Census
Benin 1979 YES NO NO YES NO NO YES YES
Benin 1992 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Benin 2002 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Benin 2013 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mali 1987 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mali 1998 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mali 2009 YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
Notes: (1) Figures ( ) are standard errors. *** denotes signicance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. (2) Standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity and clustered residuals within each administrative unit.
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Table S.16: Background information on FGC
Country: Benin Co^te d'Ivoire
Mean Std No. of Mean Std No. of
obs obs
(A) Female sample
One if cut 0.13 0.34 17388 0.44 0.49 12080
Age at FGCyz 8.95 3.38 1580 7.48 5.54 3324
One if sewn closed 0.09 0.29 2183 0.06 0.24 4714
One if cut by traditional cutters 0.91 0.27 2415 0.82 0.37 5226
Support FGC if cut (1 or 0)y 0.09 0.28 2346 0.37 0.48 5119
Benets of FGC if cut (1 or 0)
Better hygiene/cleanliness 0.01 0.13 1052 0.08 0.28 707
Social acceptance 0.29 0.45 1052 NA NA NA
Better marriage 0.03 0.17 1052 0.16 0.36 707
Keep virginity/morality 0.02 0.15 1052 0.07 0.25 707
For male pleasure 0.00 0.07 1052 0.01 0.13 707
Religious requirementy 0.19 0.39 2275 0.35 0.47 3664
(B) Male sample
Support FGC if FGC prevalence > 0 (1 or 0)y 0.04 0.21 2422 0.16 0.37 4733
Benets of FGC if FGC prevalence > 0 (1 or 0)
Better hygiene/cleanliness 0.00 0.09 1040 0.07 0.26 153
Social acceptance 0.08 0.27 1040 NA NA NA
Better marriage 0.01 0.11 1040 0.11 0.31 153
Keep virginity/morality 0.01 0.13 1040 0.14 0.35 153
For male pleasure 0.00 0.09 1040 0.05 0.22 153
Religious requirementy 0.11 0.31 2273 0.41 0.86 3988
Country: Mali Togo
Mean Std No. of Mean Std No. of
obs obs
(A) Female sample
One if cut 0.90 0.29 35779 0.08 0.28 7019
Age at FGCyz 6.15 4.02 12566 10.25 3.86 419
One if sewn closed 0.09 0.29 25509 0.19 0.39 521
One if cut by traditional cutters 0.89 0.30 32171 0.96 0.19 594
Support FGC if cut (1 or 0)y 0.83 0.37 31362 0.08 0.28 592
Benets of FGC if cut (1 or 0)
Better hygiene/cleanliness 0.22 0.41 22854 NA NA NA
Social acceptance 0.41 0.49 22854 NA NA NA
Better marriage 0.08 0.28 22854 NA NA NA
Keep virginity/morality 0.09 0.29 22854 NA NA NA
For male pleasure 0.05 0.21 22854 NA NA NA
Religious requirementy 0.80 0.39 28870 0.38 0.48 576
(B) Male sample
Support FGC if FGC prevalence > 0 (1 or 0)y 0.75 0.42 10816 0.02 0.14 1700
Benets of FGC if FGC prevalence > 0 (1 or 0)
Better hygiene/cleanliness 0.15 0.36 6802 NA NA NA
Social acceptance 0.24 0.43 6802 NA NA NA
Better marriage 0.05 0.22 6802 NA NA NA
Keep virginity/morality 0.16 0.37 6802 NA NA NA
For male pleasure 0.04 0.21 6802 NA NA NA
Religious requirementy 0.70 0.45 8909 0.08 0.27 1680
Note: (1) Those who answered \don't know" were excluded when estimating the statistics characterized as y. (2) Those who answered
\during infancy/neonatal periods" were excluded when estimating the statistics characterized as z.
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